William Twisse on Why Reprobation is not Conditional

1. No temporal thing can be the cause of that which is eternal. But the sins of men are temporal, whereas Reprobation is eternal. Therefore the sins of man cannot be the cause of Reprobation.

2. My 2^nd reason is, if permission of sin be first in intention and then damnation, it follows that permission of sin should be last in execution. But this is most absurd, namely, that a man should be first damned, and then suffered to sin.

3. Reprobation, as it signifies God’s decree, is the act of God’s will. Now, the act of God’s will is the very will of God, and the will of God is God’s essence. And, like as there can be no cause of God’s essence, so there can be no cause of God’s will, or the act thereof.

4. In saying sin foreseen is the cause of God’s decree of damnation they presuppose a prescience of sin as of the thing future, without all ground. For, nothing can be foreseen as future unless it be future. Now these dispute or’s presuppose a futurition of sin, and that from eternity, without all ground. For consider, no sin is future in its own nature, for in its own nature it is merely possible and in different, as well not to be future as to become future. Therefore it cannot pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible into the condition of a thing future without a cause. Now what cause do these men devise of this futurition of sin? Extra Deum, nothing can be the cause thereof. For this passage of things out of the condition of things possible into the condition of things future, was from everlasting, for from everlasting they were future. Otherwise, God could not have known them from everlasting. Consequently, the cause of this passage must be acknowledged to have been from everlasting, and consequently nothing without God could be the cause of it, seeing nothing without God was from everlasting. Therefore the cause hereof must be found intra Deum, within God; then either the will of God, which these men do utterly disclaim, or the knowledge of God; but that is confessed to presuppose things future rather than to make them so; or the essence of God; now that may be considered either as working necessarily, (and if in that manner it were the cause of things future, and all such things to become future by necessity of nature, which to say is atheistical) or as working freely. And this is to grant that the will of God is the cause why everything merely possible in its own nature passes from everlasting into the condition of a thing future, if so be it were future at all. And indeed seeing no other cause can be pitched upon, this free will of God must be acknowledged to be the cause of it. And consequently the reason why everything becomes future is because God has determined it shall come to pass, but with this difference: all good things God hath determined shall come to pass by his election, all evil things God has determined shall come to pass by his permission. And the Scripture naturally affords plentiful testimony to confirm this, without forcing it to interpretations congruous hereunto, upon presumptuous grounds that these arguments proceed from understandings ‘purged from prejudice and false principles.’

5. My 5^th argument is this. If sin because of Reprobation, that is, of the decree of damnation, then either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God; not by necessity of nature as all that hitherto I have known confess. But I say neither can it be by the free constitution of God; for Mark what a notorious absurdity follows hence, and that unavoidably, namely, that God did ordain, that upon foresight of sin he would ordain them to damnation. Mark it well, “God did ordain that he would ordain, or God did decree that he would decree.” In which words God’s eternal decrees made the object of God’s decree. Whereas it is well known that the objects of God’s decrees are merely things temporal and cannot be things eternal. We truly say God did decree to create the world, to preserve the world, to redeem us, call us, justify us, sanctify and save us. But it cannot be truly said that God did decree to decree, or ordain to ordain. For to decree is the act of God’s will, and therefore it cannot be the object of the act of God’s will. Yet these arguments I am not so enamored with, as to force the interpretations of Scripture to such a sense as is suitable hereunto, presuming the purity of my understanding as ‘purged from prejudice and false principles.’ I would willingly content myself with observation of the apostle’s discourse in arguing to this effect, “Before the children were born or had done good or evil, it was said, ‘the elder shall serve the younger.’” Therefore the purpose of God concerning Reprobation stands not of works. And like as hence it is inferred that therefore election stands not of good works; so therehence may I infer, that therefore Reprobation stands not of evil works.

6. If sin foreseen be the cause meritorious of Reprobation, then faith and repentance and good works are the disposing causes unto election. For therefore evil works foreseen are made the meritorious cause of reprobation because evil works existence or the meritorious cause of damnation. If this be true, then also because faith and repentance and good works are the disposing causes unto salvation, than by the same force of reason faith repentance and good works foreseen must be the disposing cause unto election. But faith, repentance, and good works foreseen are not the disposing causes unto election as I prove thus:

1. If they were then the purpose of God according to election should be of faith, repentance and good works, which is expressly denied by the apostle is touching the last part; and may as evidently be proved to be denied by him in effect of the other parts also, by the same force of argumentation which he uses: as for example, from this antecedent of the apostle’s, “Before the children were born or had done good or evil,” it no more evidently follows that therefore the purpose of God according to election is not of works, then it follows that the same purpose of God according to election is not of faith, nor of repentance. For before they were born they were no more capable of faith, or of repentance than of any other good works. And undoubtedly faith and repentance are as good works as any other.

2. If God doth absolutely work faith in some and not in others according to the mere pleasure of his will, then it cannot be said that faith foreseen is the cause of any man’s election. For in this case faith is rather the means of salvation, than salvation a means of faith. Consequently, the intention of salvation rather precedes the intention of faith than the intention of faith can be said to precede the intention of salvation. And to this the Scripture accords, Acts 13:48, “As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life,” making ordination to everlasting life the cause why men believed. Answerable hereunto is Acts 2:47, “God added daily to the church such as should be saved;” and that of Paul to Titus, “according to the faith of God’s elect.” So that according to Paul’s phrase fides est electorum, but according to the Arminian’s doctrine the inverse hereof is a more proper and natural predication, as to say electio est fidelium.

If You Don't Like What Scripture Says, Cry, "Paradox."

"This author seems to swell in the conceit of his rational performances, as if never any fly sitting upon a cart wheel on a summer's day had made such a dust as he had made. And fashioning to himself a victorious conquest, as if all his adversaries were but Pygmies to this Anakim, glad to run into corners or into acorn-cups to hide themselves there. For his reasons like some hobgoblins do so fright them more than all the spirits that stand by the naked man in the book of moons: and therefore all the help they have, if we believe this Pyrgopolynices * is to charm them by saying that 'many things delivered in Scripture, which are above the reach of human capacity, among which this is one, etc…'" – William Twisse, The Riches of God's Love unto the Vessels of Mercy...

The book which I am citing is a refutation by William Twisse of the work a Mr. Hord, an Arminian who, true to form, took issue with the Reformed doctrine of Reprobation. At the heart of the doctrine of Predestination (in its two branches, Election and Reprobation), is the question of Divine Sovereignty and human responsibility. 

Beyond the ornate 17th century rhetoric, Twisse is making an incredible point. Notice what the defense of the Arminians of Twisse’s day was: “Paradox!” When they didn’t want to accept the plain words of Scripture, the appeal was made to mystery as a way to kill the discussion. “How can God be sovereign if men have autonomous free-will?” Instead of accepting the plain teaching of Scripture that God is sovereign and men do not have autonomous free-will, because their wills are enslaved by sin, they cry up mystery in order to shut down the conversation. “How can God be love if He has not willed the salvation of everyone?” – Don’t worry; you don't have to face a hard question and actually use your brain to exegete Scripture properly. No, you can just yell, “Paradox,” and all the bad Reformers will go away. No one is allowed to appeal to Scripture once the “paradox card” has been played. 

Notice also that Twisse is not impressed by this paltry argument. He flouts the argument as if its adherents were some silly Don Quixote attacking a windmill, - trying to get God off a hook He does not want off of.

More often than not, the "paradox card" gets played today under the guise of "paradox." There is no doubt that the Bible contains rhetorical paradoxes, that is, statements in which another idea is challenged in a way which startles the reader. But we must deny that Scripture contains logical paradoxes. It has been in vogue to affirm that Scripture contains logical paradoxes since Barth and the heyday of neo-orthodoxy. We ask, “Does God speak to us in logical contradictions?” Does God say one thing which contradicts, or at least appears to contradict something else He has said? No, says the apostle Paul, “God is not the author of confusion” (1 Corinthians 14:33).

So back to the question of Divine Sovereignty and human responsibility. Is this really a paradox which cannot ever be understood? John Gerstner didn’t think so. He wrote, “We do not see why it is impossible for God to predestinate an act to come to pass by means of the deliberate choice of specific individuals” (A Predestination Primer, 26).

The Westminster Confesstion of Faith didn't take it to be a paradox either. It is important to say this because William Twisse was the Prolocutor (Moderator) as that Assembly. The Confession states, “God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established” (WCF, III, 1). In III.8 the Confession calls this doctrine a “high mystery,” which means that it is difficult to grasp, but it does not call it “paradox,” meaning impossible to reconcile. The Confession goes on to say that the doctrine should be “handled with special prudence and care.” 

This love affair with paradox goes back to Karl Barth and his “Theology of Paradox,” as Kantzer called it. Therefore this assertion of logical paradoxes in Scripture has its roots in neo-orthodoxy. You will remember that in neo-orthodoxy, Scripture is NOT the word of God, but rather contains it. Hence, Barth can claim that the Bible is nothing more that the vulnerable words of men, who were fallible and erring in their writings (C.D. 1:2:507ff). In Barth's view, it is beneath God's dignity to reveal Himself in lowly propositional statements. Therefore we are bound to encounter paradox and contradiction when we read Scripture. For him, of course, that is OK because he thinks that God's “truth” can be conveyed even in error. The logical paradoxes so fondly adhered to by modern opponents of a solid “Westminster” theology are the result of faulty exegesis. They are not the fault of the Bible. 

Twisse wrote this complaint in the 1600s. I dare say things haven't changed.

* Pyrgopolynices is a swaggering, braggart soldier in Miles Gloriosus, a comedic play written by Titus Maccius Plautus (c. 254–184 B.C.)

Notable Quotes 11

“But if salvation and damnation be no ends intended by God, but means rather, as well as creation and permission of all to sin in Adam, together with the raising of some therehence, and leaving some therein, tending to some farther end, namely, the Manifestation of God’s glory in a certain kind, as Scripture together with manifest reason doth justify. For God being the supreme efficient, must necessarily be the last end. And even where the word of God doth testify, that God created the wicked against the day of evil, it doth therewithal give to understand, that what is signified by, To the day of evil, doth not denote the end of God’s actions (that before being expressed to be God himself, God made all things for himself, not for acquiring ought unto himself, for he is perfect, that nothing can be added unto him) but for the manifestation of his most glorious nature: so that if God be pleased to manifest his glorious beneficence on man in the highest degree, and that in the way of mercy mixed with justice; this end requires and bespeaks both creation (no glory at all manifested in the way of mercy) and permission of sin (otherwise it could not be manifested in the way of mercy) and satisfaction for sin (otherwise this mercy could not be mixed with justice exactly) and faith and repentance (otherwise the good which God intends could not be bestowed by way of reward) and last of all Salvation, under which we comprehend, the highest and most blessed condition that the nature of man, continuing a mere man, is capable of. And herethence we conclude, that in case the end is such as has been specified, and all these actions following, congruous mean tending to that end, therefore the decree of manifesting God’s glory, as above specified, is first with God, and secondly the decree of the means; which means although they are many materially, yet that come all under one formal notion of means tending to a certain end, which according to the several parts of the object of one formal decree, called the decree of the means: and the intention of none of them is before another, but all intended at once, as means tending to the end which is intended. In like manner if God shall be pleased to intend the manifestation of his glory in Man or Angel, in the way of justice vindicative, the means necessarily required hereunto are, Creation, Permission to sin, and Damnation unto punishment, and all three makes up the object of one formal decree, which is to be called the decree of the means. So that like as God doth not intend the creature’s creation, before he intends his damnation, in the same respect he cannot be said to intend his damnation, before he intends his creation, or the permission of his sin.

 

“And this rightly considered, sets an end unto all quarrel about the different consideration of Man in election and reprobation, which yet is about a School point only, touching the right stating of the end and the means, and the right ordering of God’s decrees concerning them. And doth it not set an end also, to all aspersions of cruelty cast upon the holy providence of God, from the guilt of which kind blasphemies, nothing can free them; but confidence in their own way, as if it were the way of truth, and that by convincing evidence of holy Scripture? Whereas it appears how little direction they take from the Word of God throughout, for the shaping of their Tenet in this. Yet neither is any such confidence able to free them from the guilt of such blasphemies which they utter: well it may free them from the conscience of it, yet if it do, that is more than I know.”

 

William Twisse, Riches of God’s Love Unto the Vessells of Mercy, pgs 10-11