Supralapsarianism - Common Objections 4

The 4^th is that it is illogical because it conceives of a decree made in reference to nonentities.

4 This is another argument which appears more like a parlor trick than an actual, reasonable objection. I cannot see how it even rises to the level of an objection. In the common experience of all of us this exact thing happens all the time and the objector seems to be blissfully unaware of that fact. I will supply a few examples to prove this point.

I don’t mind saying that at my wedding I was very sharply dressed. I had planned to be sharply dressed and had already envisioned what I was going to wear. My very decision to wear that particular set of clothes is the reason why I bought it. So the above objection seems very weak and contrary to common fact.

The classical guitarist, Elliot Fisk, desired to perform Paganini’s 24 Caprices on guitar. When he originally planned the project, there were no known guitar techniques which would allow some of Paganini’s violin work to be played on guitar. Fisk set out to develop, or, invent, such techniques. After he successfully created the hitherto un-invented guitar techniques, he then transcribed the Caprices, and eventually recorded them. (Don’t ask how I know this; I am a metalhead, so it wouldn’t make sense.) Fisk’s ultimate design was not to create new guitar techniques or to transcribe violin music for guitar; those were merely the means necessary for the attainment of his ultimate goal. Plato said, “Necessity is the mother of invention.” We all know that the history of civilization proves this daily.

So, I find the Infralapsarian objection that Supralapsarianism entails making a decree regarding nonexistent entities more than a little unimpressive. For the life of me, I cannot see how it is a meaningful objection at all.

Supralapsarianism - Common Objections 3B

One further clarification should be made in this regard. It is often stated that Infralapsarianism views election as unconditional, but reprobation as conditional. In other words, it is said that the elect were not chosen in foresight of any good that they would do. To say so would be the rankest Pelagianism anyway. All this notwithstanding, it is frequently asserted that reprobation on the other hand is based upon foresight of sin. In fairness to my Infralapsarian friends, I must reject this position as a false representation of what Infralapsarianism teaches. Supralapsarianism and classical Infralapsarianism have always held that predestination, which is the umbrella term which includes both election and reprobation, is unconditional. Neither foresight of faith nor foresight of sin is taken into account as a condition upon which God’s choosing or rejecting of anyone is based.

Not that long ago, I posted a short piece by William Twisse on why Reprobation is not conditional. In that post, Twisse gives six reasons. At this juncture in our discussion, I would like to recap those reasons. In doing so I will modify his language in order to make myself more clearly understood. Nevertheless, the argument is essentially his.

1. Something eternal cannot be caused by something temporal. I hope after reading that we can all say, “Duh!” in unison. But of course we might wonder what this has to do with our subject. The answer to that is easy. God is eternal, hence His decree is eternal. No temporal thing could cause an eternal decision because the decision eternally existed before the temporal thing it relates to existed. The sins of men are temporal. Reprobation, being part of God’s decree of predestination, is eternal. For this reason, the sins of man cannot be the cause of reprobation.  Romans 9:11 affirms as much by telling us that neither God’s loving of Jacob, nor his hatred of Esau, was based on anything they had done because God had revealed his purpose of election before either of them was born and could have done anything good or evil.

2. If the permission of sin precedes damnation in the intention of the divine decree, then it would follow that permission of sin should be last in execution. But this is absurd. This would mean that man was damned first and then permitted to sin.

3. There is no cause of God’s essence. Reprobation, as it signifies God’s decree, is the act of God’s will. The act of God’s will is the very will of God, and the will of God is God’s essence. Since there can be no cause of God’s essence, there can be no cause of God’s will, or the act thereof.

4. Saying that foreseen sin is the cause of God’s decree of damnation presupposes a foreknowledge of sin as something future, without any logical grounds. The only way anything can be foreseen as future is if it truly is future. Foreseen sin being the cause of God’s decree of reprobation presupposes a futurition of sin from eternity, a presupposition without any logical ground. No sin is future in its own nature. In its own nature it is merely possible and indifferent – it may or may not become future. It cannot pass out of the realm of possibility into the realm of the future without a cause. What cause can be given for the futurition of sin? Apart from God nothing could be the cause because this passage of things out of the realm of possibilities into the realm of things future must have been from everlasting. This must be the case because Scripture tells us that God knows all things from everlasting. Consequently, the cause of this passage from possibility to futurity must be acknowledged to have been from everlasting, and consequently nothing without God could be the cause of it, seeing nothing without God was from everlasting. This means that the cause must be found within God. But what within God could be the cause? It could be the will of God, but that is precisely what the adherents of reprobation upon foresight of sin disclaim. It could also be the knowledge of God. However, knowledge is what presupposes something to be future rather than what makes it so. Or it could be the essence of God. Now the essence of God can be considered as working one of two ways, viz., necessarily or freely. To say that the essence of God causes things to become future by necessity of nature is not only ridiculous, but blasphemous as well. To say that the essence of God works freely is to grant that the will of God is the cause why everything merely possible in its own nature passes from everlasting into the condition of a future thing, if indeed it is a future thing at all. The only cause therefore, why a thing passes from the realm of possibility into the realm of future is because of the free will of God. Consequently, the reason why everything becomes future is because God has determined that it shall come to pass. Twisse makes only this distinction: “all good things God hath determined shall come to pass by His election, all evil things God has determined shall come to pass by His permission.”

5. If sin be the cause of Reprobation, that is, of the decree of damnation, then it must be so either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God. No one has ever held that it was by necessity of nature.  But neither could we say that it is by the free constitution of God, for this would drive us to an utterly ridiculous position. We would be forced to say that God ordained that upon foresight of sin, He would ordain them to damnation. In other words, we would be forced to affirm that God ordained that He would ordain – that He decreed that He would decree! We all know that the objects of God’s decree can only be temporal things and not eternal things. We all acknowledge that God decreed to create the world, to preserve the world, to redeem us, call us, to justify us, to sanctify us, and to glorify us. But it cannot be truly said that God did decree to decree, or ordain to ordain. Decreeing is an act of God’s will and therefore it cannot be the object of the act of God’s will. As strong as that argument is, it is still weak in comparison to Paul’s statement in Romans 9:11, “Before the children were born or had done good or evil, it was said, ’the elder shall serve the younger.’” This means that the purpose of God concerning reprobation does not stand on works. Since all Reformed folk are agreed that this passage teaches that election does not stand upon good works, why should we not infer from here that reprobation does not stand upon evil works?

6. If foreseen sin is the meritorious cause of reprobation, then faith, repentance and good works must be the disposing causes all of election. The only way one side of that statement can be true is if the other one is true as well. If evil works foreseen are the meritorious cause of reprobation, then faith, repentance and good works must be the disposing causes unto salvation and by the same force of reason faith, repentance and foreseen good works must be the disposing cause unto election.

There are two reasons why faith, repentance, and foreseen good works cannot be the disposing causes unto election:

A. If this were true then the purpose of God according to election would be of faith, repentance and good works. But this is exactly what the apostle denies when he says that God's purpose of election stored before the children were born or had done good or evil. It obviously follows that the purpose of God according to election is not of works. And if this is true (and it is true), then it follows that the same purpose of God according to election is not of faith, nor of repentance. They were no more capable of faith or repentance before they were born than they were of any other good works. And certainly faith and repentance are as good a work as any other good works.

B. If God by sovereign fiat works faith in some and not in others according to the mere pleasure of his will, then it cannot be said that foreseen faith is the cause of any man's election. For this case faith is the means of salvation rather than salvation a means of faith. Consequently the intention of salvation precedes the intention of faith rather than the intention of faith can be said to precede the intention of salvation. And this is exactly what the Scriptures say. We read in Acts 13:48, “And as many as were appointed to eternal life believed.” This simply and plainly means that God’s ordain into eternal life is the cause why men believe. We find the same idea in Acts 2:47, “And the Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved.” Similarly, we find Paul saying to Titus, “according to the faith of God's elect.”

Someone who holds to classic Infralapsarianism should have no beef with the points we have just made. Both sides of the Supra/infra discussion should be agreed that, just as election is not conditioned upon foreseen good works, neither is reprobation conditioned upon foreseen bad works. Anyone who disagrees with the above statement that Reprobation is not based upon foreseen sin is not an Infralapsarian in the classical sense of the word.

We said all that to say 2 things: First, true Reformed Infralapsarianism views predestination, which includes election and reprobation, as unconditional. Any form of Infralapsarianism which views reprobation as conditional upon foreseen bad works, is not Infralapsarian in the true sense of the word, nor is it Reformed.

Supralapsarianism - Common Objections 3A

The 3rd objection against Supralapsarianism is that it is unfair.

3 This objection, as far as I can see, fails to even reach the level of being an objection because it smuggles in illegitimate premises. One must ask first of all from whence comes this notion of fairness. If Scripture makes anything clear, it is that the decree of predestination is an act of God’s sovereignty, not His justice.

Let me make good on that assertion. In Romans 9, Paul makes the argument that predestination is an act of God’s sovereignty, not His justice. Paul is completely aware of how this will sound to his opponents, those who view God’s choice and/or rejection of individuals as being based on foreseen merit or demerit. Paul is completely aware that to the unregenerate mind this will come off as unfair. The Holy Spirit speaking through the apostle Paul anticipates this objection. So we find it written:

“What shall we say then? Is there injustice on God’s part? By no means! For he says to Moses, ‘I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion.’ So then it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God, who has mercy. For the Scripture says to Pharaoh, ‘For this very purpose I have raised you up, that I might show my power in you, and that my name might be proclaimed in all the earth.’ So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills.’ You will say to me then, ‘Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?’” Romans 9:14-19

If this objection had been due simply to a misunderstanding of Paul’s doctrine, he could easily have rectified the problem by simply modifying his statements. But we do not find Paul saying in response to this objection, “You misunderstand me, friend. I am not suggesting that God’s sovereignty extends even over the will of man. He only hardens those who resist His best efforts to save them.” Had Paul said something like that the opponent's objection would’ve dissipated instantly. The fact that Paul does not say something like this proves that he clearly concedes that he has been understood correctly by his opponent. He is therefore teaching that salvation is absolutely of the Lord, and that predestination is absolutely an act of divine sovereignty, not justice.

This is further seen by what Paul actually does say in response to this objection. Romans 9:20 says, "But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, 'Why have you made me like this?'” Notice the argument of this passage. This is not an appeal to justice or fair play. It is an appeal to God’s absolute sovereign power. He goes on to say, “Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use?” And this is a very powerful statement because it tells us, not that there was a fallen lump out of which honorable vessels and dishonorable vessels were formed, but that the one lump is comprised of vessels with a specific use already purposed. For in verses 22-24, he says, “What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory — even us whom he has called, not from the Jews only but also from the Gentiles?” This is incredibly strong language. For Paul not only says that some vessels were actually “prepared for glory,” which is a reference to election, but he also says that some vessels were actually “prepared for destruction,” which is a reference to reprobation. He furthermore says that reprobation serves election. And on top of it all, Paul makes it undeniably clear that predestination, which comprises election and reprobation, is not an act of God’s justice, but of his sovereignty. It is therefore unconditional.

Supralapsarianism - Common Objections 2

The 2^nd objection is this: Supralapsarianism makes God the author of sin.

2 Having pointed out that the first objection is unfair, we must further point out that the 2nd objection is even worse. You’ll remember that this objection claims that Supralapsarianism makes God the author of sin. This is absolutely untrue! Truth be told, Infralapsarianism does not escape this false accusation either. If what Infralapsarianism teaches is correct, namely that God is free from eternity to create or not to create, and that he created knowing with infallible certainty (decreeing that man should fall), then God should not have created. Thus we see that the Infralapsarians do not escape the reproach of those who want to say that God is the cause of perdition of man and the author of sin. Again, if it’s good enough for the goose, it should be good enough for the gander. No Infralapsarian has any business lodging this objection against Supralapsarianism because that knife cuts both ways.

Let me use a critic’s own words to show that Infralapsarianism is not off the hook with regard of the question of the origin of evil. Louis Berkhof, describing Supralapsarianism, which he at least mildly disagrees with, writes, “The order of the decrees, as accepted by the Supralapsarians, is regarded as the more ideal, the more logical and unified of the two. It clearly exhibits the rational order which exists between the ultimate end and the intermediate means. Therefore the Supralapsarians can, while the infralapsarians cannot, give a specific answer to the question why God decreed to create the world and to permit the fall. They do full justice to the sovereignty of God and refrain from all futile attempts to justify God in the sight of men, while the infralapsarian hesitate, attempt to prove the justice of God’s procedure, and yet in end must come to the same conclusion as the Supralapsarians, namely, that, in the last analysis, the decree to permit the fall finds its explanation only in the sovereign good pleasure of God” (Systematic Theology, p. 121).

That statement, taken at face value, would seem to make Infralapsarianism absolutely untenable. A couple of pages later, Berkhof makes the case for Infralapsarianism even worse, when he says, “Infralapsarianism really wants to explain reprobation as an act of God’s justice. It is inclined to deny either explicitly or implicitly that it as an act of mere good pleasure of God. This really makes the decree of reprobation a conditional decree and leads into the Arminian fold. But infralapsarians on the whole do not want to teach a conditional decree, and express themselves guardedly on this matter. Some of them admit that it is a mistake to consider reprobation purely as an act of divine justice. And this is perfectly correct. Sin is not the ultimate cause of reprobation any more then faith and good works are the cause of election, for all men are by nature dead in sin and trespasses. When confronted with the problem of reprobation, infralapsarians, too, can find the answer only in the good pleasure of God. Their language may sound more tender than that of the Supralapsarians, but is also more apt to be misunderstood, and after all proves to convey the same idea” (ibid. P. 124). If you were trying to come up with a stronger defense of Supralapsarianism, you would be hard-pressed to do better than this.

As I said, Infralapsarianism is not off the hook with regard to the question of the origin of evil are sin. Sometimes people smuggle in the standard of justice that rejects God’s absolute sovereignty in order to evaluate God’s decrees by it. Berkhof complains that Supralapsarianism does not give a solution to the problem of sin. He says that it what effect dare to say that God decreed to bring it into the world by his own direct efficiency. He seems to be unaware of the fact that some theologians do dare to say that God decreed to bring it into the world by some direct efficiency. And the truth of the matter is, Infralapsarianism cannot escape this charge either. Waffling on this question frequently forces people into a position which sounds an awful lot like dualism. I understand the reticence of pinning the responsibility for the existence of evil on God in any way, shape, or form. But the "mere permission" response comes awful close to saying that some other power has the ability to generate and control sin by its own direct efficiency, which, as I said, sounds suspiciously like dualism. Pushing the responsibility onto the shoulders of men or demons, doesn’t really answer anything. Adding more cars to train does not account for its movement; for that you need an engine.

Supralapsarianism - Common Objections 1

There are 4 common objections which are raised against the Supralapsarian position.

The 1^st objection is this: The elect and Christ are chosen in one decree.

The 2^nd objection is this: Supralapsarianism makes God the author of sin.

The 3^rd objection is that it is unfair.

The 4^th is that it is illogical because it conceives of a decree made in reference to nonentities.

I do not presume to suggest that these are the only objections ever raised against Supralapsarianism. But I do know that they are the most common. I would like to look at each one of them and explain why they either fail to reach the level of a legitimate objection, or raise questions which argue against the opposing view with at least as much force.

1 Because Supralapsarianism places election before the fall (before the necessity of the Mediator and Savior) it hereby separates the election of Christ from that of all the elect.

With regard to the first objection G.H. Kersten writes, “Although the election of Christ and of the elect is one decree, yet the chosen Mediator must be considered in two respects: as the Head of His elect, and as a representative Covenant Head. In election Christ is the Head of the Church that God has decreed to create in order to accomplish His sovereign predestination, and to save it through the depth of Adam’s fall, and therefore in predestination it must be considered as not yet created, nor fallen. In the Covenant of Redemption the elect are indeed seen is already created and fallen, for Christ represents them to satisfy all the requirements of the Covenant in their place, and to place them in covenant relationship to God unto salvation. He is able to represent them as their covenant Head because they are comprehended in Him by virtue of election just as Adam could place all his posterity into covenant relationship with God, because they were all in him because of creation. The Infralapsarian also makes a distinction in the one decree, although they do it in another order, separating creation and the fall from election and reprobation. But then the objection that the Supralapsarians separates the election of Christ from that of all the elect also falls away because predestination occurs out of sovereignty, and is not an act of mercy and of justice. It determines who shall and shall not be saved. The Covenant of Redemption teaches us how the elect shall be saved. Establishing this covenant brings the suretyship which is demanded from Christ to satisfy the violated righteousness of God. Neither do the Supralapsarians thus make a separation between the election of Christ and out of all the other elect.”-Reformed Dogmatics, Volume 1, Part 1, Chapter 8.

Kersten is arguing that this is an unfair, if not specious, objection. Supralapsarianism is accused of inserting a separation into God’s singular decree. If this is a valid objection, Infralapsarianism must fall by the same sword, since it makes a distinction in the one decree as well. Supralapsarianism views Christ, first as Head of the Church, which is comprised of those whom elected unto salvation, and secondly as a representative Covenant Head. Viewing Christ in these 2 respects allows us to make a distinction without making a separation between the election of Christ and that of all the other elect.

The objection is therefore not a valid one. But as we already mentioned, it appears to be an unfair argument as well. If Supralapsarianism is false because it makes a distinction in the one decree, Infralapsarianism must be false too, because it makes a distinction in the one decree. If it’s good enough for the goose, it should be good enough for the gander. Not to make too fine a point of it, but if that argument is unfair, then it’s unfair no matter who is used against.

This objection falls apart as soon as we realize that what is under discussion is the logical conception of the thing not its historical execution. Infralapsarianism, it seems to me, makes this mistake.