Supralapsarianism - Common Objections 4

The 4^th is that it is illogical because it conceives of a decree made in reference to nonentities.

4 This is another argument which appears more like a parlor trick than an actual, reasonable objection. I cannot see how it even rises to the level of an objection. In the common experience of all of us this exact thing happens all the time and the objector seems to be blissfully unaware of that fact. I will supply a few examples to prove this point.

I don’t mind saying that at my wedding I was very sharply dressed. I had planned to be sharply dressed and had already envisioned what I was going to wear. My very decision to wear that particular set of clothes is the reason why I bought it. So the above objection seems very weak and contrary to common fact.

The classical guitarist, Elliot Fisk, desired to perform Paganini’s 24 Caprices on guitar. When he originally planned the project, there were no known guitar techniques which would allow some of Paganini’s violin work to be played on guitar. Fisk set out to develop, or, invent, such techniques. After he successfully created the hitherto un-invented guitar techniques, he then transcribed the Caprices, and eventually recorded them. (Don’t ask how I know this; I am a metalhead, so it wouldn’t make sense.) Fisk’s ultimate design was not to create new guitar techniques or to transcribe violin music for guitar; those were merely the means necessary for the attainment of his ultimate goal. Plato said, “Necessity is the mother of invention.” We all know that the history of civilization proves this daily.

So, I find the Infralapsarian objection that Supralapsarianism entails making a decree regarding nonexistent entities more than a little unimpressive. For the life of me, I cannot see how it is a meaningful objection at all.

Supralapsarianism - Common Objections 3B

One further clarification should be made in this regard. It is often stated that Infralapsarianism views election as unconditional, but reprobation as conditional. In other words, it is said that the elect were not chosen in foresight of any good that they would do. To say so would be the rankest Pelagianism anyway. All this notwithstanding, it is frequently asserted that reprobation on the other hand is based upon foresight of sin. In fairness to my Infralapsarian friends, I must reject this position as a false representation of what Infralapsarianism teaches. Supralapsarianism and classical Infralapsarianism have always held that predestination, which is the umbrella term which includes both election and reprobation, is unconditional. Neither foresight of faith nor foresight of sin is taken into account as a condition upon which God’s choosing or rejecting of anyone is based.

Not that long ago, I posted a short piece by William Twisse on why Reprobation is not conditional. In that post, Twisse gives six reasons. At this juncture in our discussion, I would like to recap those reasons. In doing so I will modify his language in order to make myself more clearly understood. Nevertheless, the argument is essentially his.

1. Something eternal cannot be caused by something temporal. I hope after reading that we can all say, “Duh!” in unison. But of course we might wonder what this has to do with our subject. The answer to that is easy. God is eternal, hence His decree is eternal. No temporal thing could cause an eternal decision because the decision eternally existed before the temporal thing it relates to existed. The sins of men are temporal. Reprobation, being part of God’s decree of predestination, is eternal. For this reason, the sins of man cannot be the cause of reprobation.  Romans 9:11 affirms as much by telling us that neither God’s loving of Jacob, nor his hatred of Esau, was based on anything they had done because God had revealed his purpose of election before either of them was born and could have done anything good or evil.

2. If the permission of sin precedes damnation in the intention of the divine decree, then it would follow that permission of sin should be last in execution. But this is absurd. This would mean that man was damned first and then permitted to sin.

3. There is no cause of God’s essence. Reprobation, as it signifies God’s decree, is the act of God’s will. The act of God’s will is the very will of God, and the will of God is God’s essence. Since there can be no cause of God’s essence, there can be no cause of God’s will, or the act thereof.

4. Saying that foreseen sin is the cause of God’s decree of damnation presupposes a foreknowledge of sin as something future, without any logical grounds. The only way anything can be foreseen as future is if it truly is future. Foreseen sin being the cause of God’s decree of reprobation presupposes a futurition of sin from eternity, a presupposition without any logical ground. No sin is future in its own nature. In its own nature it is merely possible and indifferent – it may or may not become future. It cannot pass out of the realm of possibility into the realm of the future without a cause. What cause can be given for the futurition of sin? Apart from God nothing could be the cause because this passage of things out of the realm of possibilities into the realm of things future must have been from everlasting. This must be the case because Scripture tells us that God knows all things from everlasting. Consequently, the cause of this passage from possibility to futurity must be acknowledged to have been from everlasting, and consequently nothing without God could be the cause of it, seeing nothing without God was from everlasting. This means that the cause must be found within God. But what within God could be the cause? It could be the will of God, but that is precisely what the adherents of reprobation upon foresight of sin disclaim. It could also be the knowledge of God. However, knowledge is what presupposes something to be future rather than what makes it so. Or it could be the essence of God. Now the essence of God can be considered as working one of two ways, viz., necessarily or freely. To say that the essence of God causes things to become future by necessity of nature is not only ridiculous, but blasphemous as well. To say that the essence of God works freely is to grant that the will of God is the cause why everything merely possible in its own nature passes from everlasting into the condition of a future thing, if indeed it is a future thing at all. The only cause therefore, why a thing passes from the realm of possibility into the realm of future is because of the free will of God. Consequently, the reason why everything becomes future is because God has determined that it shall come to pass. Twisse makes only this distinction: “all good things God hath determined shall come to pass by His election, all evil things God has determined shall come to pass by His permission.”

5. If sin be the cause of Reprobation, that is, of the decree of damnation, then it must be so either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God. No one has ever held that it was by necessity of nature.  But neither could we say that it is by the free constitution of God, for this would drive us to an utterly ridiculous position. We would be forced to say that God ordained that upon foresight of sin, He would ordain them to damnation. In other words, we would be forced to affirm that God ordained that He would ordain – that He decreed that He would decree! We all know that the objects of God’s decree can only be temporal things and not eternal things. We all acknowledge that God decreed to create the world, to preserve the world, to redeem us, call us, to justify us, to sanctify us, and to glorify us. But it cannot be truly said that God did decree to decree, or ordain to ordain. Decreeing is an act of God’s will and therefore it cannot be the object of the act of God’s will. As strong as that argument is, it is still weak in comparison to Paul’s statement in Romans 9:11, “Before the children were born or had done good or evil, it was said, ’the elder shall serve the younger.’” This means that the purpose of God concerning reprobation does not stand on works. Since all Reformed folk are agreed that this passage teaches that election does not stand upon good works, why should we not infer from here that reprobation does not stand upon evil works?

6. If foreseen sin is the meritorious cause of reprobation, then faith, repentance and good works must be the disposing causes all of election. The only way one side of that statement can be true is if the other one is true as well. If evil works foreseen are the meritorious cause of reprobation, then faith, repentance and good works must be the disposing causes unto salvation and by the same force of reason faith, repentance and foreseen good works must be the disposing cause unto election.

There are two reasons why faith, repentance, and foreseen good works cannot be the disposing causes unto election:

A. If this were true then the purpose of God according to election would be of faith, repentance and good works. But this is exactly what the apostle denies when he says that God's purpose of election stored before the children were born or had done good or evil. It obviously follows that the purpose of God according to election is not of works. And if this is true (and it is true), then it follows that the same purpose of God according to election is not of faith, nor of repentance. They were no more capable of faith or repentance before they were born than they were of any other good works. And certainly faith and repentance are as good a work as any other good works.

B. If God by sovereign fiat works faith in some and not in others according to the mere pleasure of his will, then it cannot be said that foreseen faith is the cause of any man's election. For this case faith is the means of salvation rather than salvation a means of faith. Consequently the intention of salvation precedes the intention of faith rather than the intention of faith can be said to precede the intention of salvation. And this is exactly what the Scriptures say. We read in Acts 13:48, “And as many as were appointed to eternal life believed.” This simply and plainly means that God’s ordain into eternal life is the cause why men believe. We find the same idea in Acts 2:47, “And the Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved.” Similarly, we find Paul saying to Titus, “according to the faith of God's elect.”

Someone who holds to classic Infralapsarianism should have no beef with the points we have just made. Both sides of the Supra/infra discussion should be agreed that, just as election is not conditioned upon foreseen good works, neither is reprobation conditioned upon foreseen bad works. Anyone who disagrees with the above statement that Reprobation is not based upon foreseen sin is not an Infralapsarian in the classical sense of the word.

We said all that to say 2 things: First, true Reformed Infralapsarianism views predestination, which includes election and reprobation, as unconditional. Any form of Infralapsarianism which views reprobation as conditional upon foreseen bad works, is not Infralapsarian in the true sense of the word, nor is it Reformed.

Supralapsarianism - Common Objections 3A

The 3rd objection against Supralapsarianism is that it is unfair.

3 This objection, as far as I can see, fails to even reach the level of being an objection because it smuggles in illegitimate premises. One must ask first of all from whence comes this notion of fairness. If Scripture makes anything clear, it is that the decree of predestination is an act of God’s sovereignty, not His justice.

Let me make good on that assertion. In Romans 9, Paul makes the argument that predestination is an act of God’s sovereignty, not His justice. Paul is completely aware of how this will sound to his opponents, those who view God’s choice and/or rejection of individuals as being based on foreseen merit or demerit. Paul is completely aware that to the unregenerate mind this will come off as unfair. The Holy Spirit speaking through the apostle Paul anticipates this objection. So we find it written:

“What shall we say then? Is there injustice on God’s part? By no means! For he says to Moses, ‘I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion.’ So then it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God, who has mercy. For the Scripture says to Pharaoh, ‘For this very purpose I have raised you up, that I might show my power in you, and that my name might be proclaimed in all the earth.’ So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills.’ You will say to me then, ‘Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?’” Romans 9:14-19

If this objection had been due simply to a misunderstanding of Paul’s doctrine, he could easily have rectified the problem by simply modifying his statements. But we do not find Paul saying in response to this objection, “You misunderstand me, friend. I am not suggesting that God’s sovereignty extends even over the will of man. He only hardens those who resist His best efforts to save them.” Had Paul said something like that the opponent's objection would’ve dissipated instantly. The fact that Paul does not say something like this proves that he clearly concedes that he has been understood correctly by his opponent. He is therefore teaching that salvation is absolutely of the Lord, and that predestination is absolutely an act of divine sovereignty, not justice.

This is further seen by what Paul actually does say in response to this objection. Romans 9:20 says, "But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, 'Why have you made me like this?'” Notice the argument of this passage. This is not an appeal to justice or fair play. It is an appeal to God’s absolute sovereign power. He goes on to say, “Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use?” And this is a very powerful statement because it tells us, not that there was a fallen lump out of which honorable vessels and dishonorable vessels were formed, but that the one lump is comprised of vessels with a specific use already purposed. For in verses 22-24, he says, “What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory — even us whom he has called, not from the Jews only but also from the Gentiles?” This is incredibly strong language. For Paul not only says that some vessels were actually “prepared for glory,” which is a reference to election, but he also says that some vessels were actually “prepared for destruction,” which is a reference to reprobation. He furthermore says that reprobation serves election. And on top of it all, Paul makes it undeniably clear that predestination, which comprises election and reprobation, is not an act of God’s justice, but of his sovereignty. It is therefore unconditional.

Supralapsarianism - Common Objections 2

The 2^nd objection is this: Supralapsarianism makes God the author of sin.

2 Having pointed out that the first objection is unfair, we must further point out that the 2nd objection is even worse. You’ll remember that this objection claims that Supralapsarianism makes God the author of sin. This is absolutely untrue! Truth be told, Infralapsarianism does not escape this false accusation either. If what Infralapsarianism teaches is correct, namely that God is free from eternity to create or not to create, and that he created knowing with infallible certainty (decreeing that man should fall), then God should not have created. Thus we see that the Infralapsarians do not escape the reproach of those who want to say that God is the cause of perdition of man and the author of sin. Again, if it’s good enough for the goose, it should be good enough for the gander. No Infralapsarian has any business lodging this objection against Supralapsarianism because that knife cuts both ways.

Let me use a critic’s own words to show that Infralapsarianism is not off the hook with regard of the question of the origin of evil. Louis Berkhof, describing Supralapsarianism, which he at least mildly disagrees with, writes, “The order of the decrees, as accepted by the Supralapsarians, is regarded as the more ideal, the more logical and unified of the two. It clearly exhibits the rational order which exists between the ultimate end and the intermediate means. Therefore the Supralapsarians can, while the infralapsarians cannot, give a specific answer to the question why God decreed to create the world and to permit the fall. They do full justice to the sovereignty of God and refrain from all futile attempts to justify God in the sight of men, while the infralapsarian hesitate, attempt to prove the justice of God’s procedure, and yet in end must come to the same conclusion as the Supralapsarians, namely, that, in the last analysis, the decree to permit the fall finds its explanation only in the sovereign good pleasure of God” (Systematic Theology, p. 121).

That statement, taken at face value, would seem to make Infralapsarianism absolutely untenable. A couple of pages later, Berkhof makes the case for Infralapsarianism even worse, when he says, “Infralapsarianism really wants to explain reprobation as an act of God’s justice. It is inclined to deny either explicitly or implicitly that it as an act of mere good pleasure of God. This really makes the decree of reprobation a conditional decree and leads into the Arminian fold. But infralapsarians on the whole do not want to teach a conditional decree, and express themselves guardedly on this matter. Some of them admit that it is a mistake to consider reprobation purely as an act of divine justice. And this is perfectly correct. Sin is not the ultimate cause of reprobation any more then faith and good works are the cause of election, for all men are by nature dead in sin and trespasses. When confronted with the problem of reprobation, infralapsarians, too, can find the answer only in the good pleasure of God. Their language may sound more tender than that of the Supralapsarians, but is also more apt to be misunderstood, and after all proves to convey the same idea” (ibid. P. 124). If you were trying to come up with a stronger defense of Supralapsarianism, you would be hard-pressed to do better than this.

As I said, Infralapsarianism is not off the hook with regard to the question of the origin of evil are sin. Sometimes people smuggle in the standard of justice that rejects God’s absolute sovereignty in order to evaluate God’s decrees by it. Berkhof complains that Supralapsarianism does not give a solution to the problem of sin. He says that it what effect dare to say that God decreed to bring it into the world by his own direct efficiency. He seems to be unaware of the fact that some theologians do dare to say that God decreed to bring it into the world by some direct efficiency. And the truth of the matter is, Infralapsarianism cannot escape this charge either. Waffling on this question frequently forces people into a position which sounds an awful lot like dualism. I understand the reticence of pinning the responsibility for the existence of evil on God in any way, shape, or form. But the "mere permission" response comes awful close to saying that some other power has the ability to generate and control sin by its own direct efficiency, which, as I said, sounds suspiciously like dualism. Pushing the responsibility onto the shoulders of men or demons, doesn’t really answer anything. Adding more cars to train does not account for its movement; for that you need an engine.

Supralapsarianism - Common Objections 1

There are 4 common objections which are raised against the Supralapsarian position.

The 1^st objection is this: The elect and Christ are chosen in one decree.

The 2^nd objection is this: Supralapsarianism makes God the author of sin.

The 3^rd objection is that it is unfair.

The 4^th is that it is illogical because it conceives of a decree made in reference to nonentities.

I do not presume to suggest that these are the only objections ever raised against Supralapsarianism. But I do know that they are the most common. I would like to look at each one of them and explain why they either fail to reach the level of a legitimate objection, or raise questions which argue against the opposing view with at least as much force.

1 Because Supralapsarianism places election before the fall (before the necessity of the Mediator and Savior) it hereby separates the election of Christ from that of all the elect.

With regard to the first objection G.H. Kersten writes, “Although the election of Christ and of the elect is one decree, yet the chosen Mediator must be considered in two respects: as the Head of His elect, and as a representative Covenant Head. In election Christ is the Head of the Church that God has decreed to create in order to accomplish His sovereign predestination, and to save it through the depth of Adam’s fall, and therefore in predestination it must be considered as not yet created, nor fallen. In the Covenant of Redemption the elect are indeed seen is already created and fallen, for Christ represents them to satisfy all the requirements of the Covenant in their place, and to place them in covenant relationship to God unto salvation. He is able to represent them as their covenant Head because they are comprehended in Him by virtue of election just as Adam could place all his posterity into covenant relationship with God, because they were all in him because of creation. The Infralapsarian also makes a distinction in the one decree, although they do it in another order, separating creation and the fall from election and reprobation. But then the objection that the Supralapsarians separates the election of Christ from that of all the elect also falls away because predestination occurs out of sovereignty, and is not an act of mercy and of justice. It determines who shall and shall not be saved. The Covenant of Redemption teaches us how the elect shall be saved. Establishing this covenant brings the suretyship which is demanded from Christ to satisfy the violated righteousness of God. Neither do the Supralapsarians thus make a separation between the election of Christ and out of all the other elect.”-Reformed Dogmatics, Volume 1, Part 1, Chapter 8.

Kersten is arguing that this is an unfair, if not specious, objection. Supralapsarianism is accused of inserting a separation into God’s singular decree. If this is a valid objection, Infralapsarianism must fall by the same sword, since it makes a distinction in the one decree as well. Supralapsarianism views Christ, first as Head of the Church, which is comprised of those whom elected unto salvation, and secondly as a representative Covenant Head. Viewing Christ in these 2 respects allows us to make a distinction without making a separation between the election of Christ and that of all the other elect.

The objection is therefore not a valid one. But as we already mentioned, it appears to be an unfair argument as well. If Supralapsarianism is false because it makes a distinction in the one decree, Infralapsarianism must be false too, because it makes a distinction in the one decree. If it’s good enough for the goose, it should be good enough for the gander. Not to make too fine a point of it, but if that argument is unfair, then it’s unfair no matter who is used against.

This objection falls apart as soon as we realize that what is under discussion is the logical conception of the thing not its historical execution. Infralapsarianism, it seems to me, makes this mistake.

Lapsarian Chart

The following chart shows the various positions regarding the order of God's decree regarding predestination. Supralapsarianism is the position which this author affirms. Many orthodox Reformed theologians hold to Infralapsarianism.

Amryraldian theory asserts that because of God's love to fallen men He appointed Christ as a mediator for every single individual human being – and that by this means all barriers on the side of Divine justice have been removed. Salvation is thus said to have been made possible, but it adds the condition which switches the application of it to God's sovereign will: it is for all if they believe. It should be obvious that this theory alters the nature of the atonement. It holds that Christ, by His own intention and the Father's purpose, died for everyone, that a salvation was purchased for everyone though not applied to everyone. Moreover, the atonement, though not actually securing redemption or faith - by causal connection, made it possible for God to bestow salvation on anyone He pleased and to form a new covenant of grace with humanity in general. Thus the atonement is not a transaction in its own nature, involving a covenant or substitution and securing its own application. Again, note that, like Arminianism, this theory falsely assumes that a limitation to the extent of the atonement is somehow a limitation to the power of God and the love of God. It is frequently dubbed "Four-Point Calvinism." I hold Amyraldism to be heretical and I have written about it here and here. 

It goes without saying that since this blog uncompromisingly holds to Reformed theology, I have nothing but scorn for Arminianism.

Supralapsarianism - A Brief Historical Background, part 2

Before we proceed, a couple of important remarks should be made. First of all, the aforementioned list of illustrious theologians has not been supplied in order to coerce anyone into acquiescence. Anyone who claims the moniker, Reformed, should know better. On the other hand it does serve to illustrate that this is a position which does not lack intellectual integrity. Secondly, this should serve the brakes on the inane statement that only 5% of Reformed theologians have adhered to Supralapsarianism. It is asserted that Loraine Boettner claimed that no major Reformed theologians are/were Supralapsarian. I do not profess to know what Boettner meant by that statement, but I do know how people take it. You will notice that the first names I listed were the Magisterial Reformers themselves. If Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, and Beza held to Supralapsarianism, and their works are the theological framework for the Reformation, then it is not incumbent upon the 5% to prove their position, but upon the 95%. The burden of proof lies with them to demonstrate biblically why they are correct to not toe the line of their Reformed forebears.

Just as an aside, before we proceed any further, perhaps it would be good to demonstrate that Calvin was a Supralapsarian. Here is a very representative quote from his Institutes. Calvin writes, "As the Lord, by His effectual calling of the elect, completes the salvation to which He predestinated them in His eternal counsel, so He has His judgments against the reprobate, by which He executes His counsel respecting them. Those, therefore, whom He has created to a life of shame and a death of destruction, that they might be instruments of His wrath, and examples of His severity, He causes to reach their appointed end, sometimes depriving them of the opportunity of hearing the Word, sometimes, by the preaching of it, increasing their blindness and stupidity" (3.24.12).

Note carefully the words, "Those, therefore, whom He has created to a life of shame and a death of destruction, that they might be instruments of His wrath, and examples of His severity." This is clearly a Supralapsarian construction of the decree of Predestination. Calvin makes reprobation active; He doesn’t simply say "passed by" or "decreed to leave" or something similar. He says, "created to ...', which means the end of destruction. That is considerably stronger language than Belgic Confession 16 or Canons of Dordt 1:10, 15.

A 2nd historical fact needs to be addressed as well. Several of the important figures, make that, most important figures, at the Synod of Dort were Supralapsarians – such as the president Johannes Bogerman, Francisus Gomarus, Gijsbert Voetius. In fact one of the issues which the Synod dealt with was the “Maccovius” affair. Maccovius, professor of theology at Franeker, had been charged with heresy for teaching, among other things, Supralapsarianism. The charges were brought by his colleague, Lubertus. Maccovius appealed to the Synod. On the committee which heard his case were Bogerman and Gomarus, both Supralapsarians. The Synod did not condemn his Supralapsarianism, but it did warn him to not make his language too strong.

The Arminians attempted to exploit this in-house disagreement as an opportunity to draw attention away from their own heresy as if it were merely their intention to fight against Supralapsarianism, which they demanded be condemned. Synod president Bogerman refused to satisfy their demands and found a formula that could be accepted by both parties (Supra and Infra), since it only stated that predestination is an act of God’s sovereignty.

Two and a half decades later, the Westminster Assembly (1643 – 1648) left the question undecided. This is historically significant because the assembly was held 25 years after the Synod of Dort, which means that the English theologian’s new all about the controversy. Furthermore, the Prolocutor of the Assembly (i.e. moderator) William Twisse, was a Supralapsarian. A stauncher Supralapsarian has probably never lived.

It is frequently argued that the Canons of Dort and the Westminster Standards are expressly Infralapsarian. That is a highly problematic assertion since it requires that men such as Bogerman, Gomarus, Voetius and Twisse all assigned creeds against their own convictions.

Having said that, we must hasten to add that both positions can certainly forbear each other because both parties clearly maintain the sovereignty of God’s decree, and neither denies man’s responsibility for his acts. Neither position can be condemned as un-Reformed. A simple proof of this can be found in the ultimate primer for Supralapsariansism, William Twisse's "The Riches of God's Love Unto the Vessells of Mercy, Consistent with His Absolute Hatred or Reprobation on the Vessells of Wrath." Twisse spends the first 30+ pages defining and defending the Supralapsarian position, but most of the rest of the book defending Infralapsarianism from Arminian cavils.

Supralapsarianism - A Brief Historical Background, part 1

In the upcoming series of posts, I wish to look at the subject of Supralapsarianism. To do so course, we must first acknowledge that this is a strictly Reformed category, and distinguish it as well from the viewpoint called Infralapsarianism. The names were first introduced in the days of the Arminian disputes when pamphlets published spoke of a “high” and “low” doctrine concerning predestination. The terms were used at the Synod of Dort, yet the subject to which these terms are affixed has existed in the church since the days of old. The difference between these terms indicates the opinions among orthodox Reformed theologians concerning the order of decrees of God in relation to the eternal state of man. Supralapsarianism states that in the decree of election and rejection God did not consider man is already created and fallen, but that man was then represented as still to be created and still to fall.

Infralapsarianism, on the other hand, views man in predestination as having been created and having fallen. This is not to say that God elected and rejected man after he was created and after he had fallen, because Infralapsarianism also teaches election and reprobation from eternity. The distinction is that God elected Psalm out of fallen mankind as he saw them by virtue of his eternal foreknowledge.

We first become familiar with these 2 terms around the time of the Synod of Dort. But the concepts embodied by these 2 terms services much earlier and in similar circumstances. The Synod of Dort was handling the issue of Arminianism. But many centuries earlier Augustine, in his confrontations with the Fountainhead of Arminianism, Pelagius, drew up his argument along the lines of Supralapsarianism. Pelagius stated his position thus: God had –

1) decreed to create man,

2) decreed to send Christ to satisfy for all men for the foreseen, but not decreed fall, and

3) decreed to condemn and to save on the grounds of foreseen unbelief on the one hand and on the ground the foreseen faith and good works on the other hand.

It is true that generally speaking, Augustine did choose the viewpoint of Infralapsarianism. But in his confrontation with Pelagius, he clearly argued in a Supralapsarian way. Augustine opposed Pelagius by saying that God’s decree is the cause of all things, good and evil. God did not wait to see what man would do and then decree. On the contrary all the acts of man are the performance of God’s decree in which the permission is also determined. The permission to sin, therefore is not negative, positive. God’s decree precedes the fall. Whatever happens against God’s revealed will does not happen without he’s decreed will. God not only permits things knowingly, but willingly. Reprobation, therefore, is an act of God’s sovereignty, not of his justice.

Let’s pause for a second to distinguish, or delineate the two views, before we proceed with the short historical background.

The two views can be presented thus:

Supralapsarianism:

1. Predestination (Election and Reprobation)

2. Creation

3. The Fall

Notice that Predestination is above the fall logically considered, hence supra.

Infralapsarianism:

1. Creation

2. The Fall

3. Predestination (Election and Reprobation)

Notice that Predestination is placed below the Fall logically considered, hence infra.

The difference between the two views has nothing to do with the temporal order of the Divine decrees, since that is an oxymoron. God is not bound by our dimension of time. He is eternal in the truest sense of the word. Nothing is ever before or after to God. He views all things, as Boethius says, in an everlasting present. This means that the decrees of God are not to be viewed in a temporal way. What the two views are referring to is logical order.

The Supralaspsarian places predestination above the Fall, in logical order. He therefore teaches:

A. God has decreed to glorify Himself in angels and men, in both His righteousness and His mercy. Hence,

B. He decreed creation and the Fall.

Essentially, what this says is, Predestination, which includes Election and Reprobation, precedes creation and the Fall, also in God’s decree. They are the means of accomplishing predestination.

The Infralapsarian, on the other hand, says that God elected and rejected already viewed as created and fallen, i.e., predestined out of fallen humanity.

The Reformers Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Beza, Knox, Musculus, and Ramus were all Supralapsarians. Other notable Supralapsarians were Gottschalk of Orbais (808 – 867); William Ames (1576-1633), Johannes Bogerman (1576-1637) , Synod of Dort president, Giovanni Diodati (1576-1649), Francis Gomarus (1563-1641), Thomas Goodwin (1600-1680), William Perkins (1558-1602), Samuel Rutherford (1600-1661), Robert Traill (1642-1716), Augustus M. Toplady (1740–1778), Theodore Tronchin (1582-1687) Beza’s son-in-law, Benedict Turretin (1588-1631) Francis’ father , William Twisse, (1578-1646) Prolucutor of the Westminster Assembly; Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499-1562), Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676), William Whitaker (1548-1595), and Jerome Zanchius (1516-1590).

William Twisse on Why Reprobation is not Conditional

1. No temporal thing can be the cause of that which is eternal. But the sins of men are temporal, whereas Reprobation is eternal. Therefore the sins of man cannot be the cause of Reprobation.

2. My 2^nd reason is, if permission of sin be first in intention and then damnation, it follows that permission of sin should be last in execution. But this is most absurd, namely, that a man should be first damned, and then suffered to sin.

3. Reprobation, as it signifies God’s decree, is the act of God’s will. Now, the act of God’s will is the very will of God, and the will of God is God’s essence. And, like as there can be no cause of God’s essence, so there can be no cause of God’s will, or the act thereof.

4. In saying sin foreseen is the cause of God’s decree of damnation they presuppose a prescience of sin as of the thing future, without all ground. For, nothing can be foreseen as future unless it be future. Now these dispute or’s presuppose a futurition of sin, and that from eternity, without all ground. For consider, no sin is future in its own nature, for in its own nature it is merely possible and in different, as well not to be future as to become future. Therefore it cannot pass out of the condition of a thing merely possible into the condition of a thing future without a cause. Now what cause do these men devise of this futurition of sin? Extra Deum, nothing can be the cause thereof. For this passage of things out of the condition of things possible into the condition of things future, was from everlasting, for from everlasting they were future. Otherwise, God could not have known them from everlasting. Consequently, the cause of this passage must be acknowledged to have been from everlasting, and consequently nothing without God could be the cause of it, seeing nothing without God was from everlasting. Therefore the cause hereof must be found intra Deum, within God; then either the will of God, which these men do utterly disclaim, or the knowledge of God; but that is confessed to presuppose things future rather than to make them so; or the essence of God; now that may be considered either as working necessarily, (and if in that manner it were the cause of things future, and all such things to become future by necessity of nature, which to say is atheistical) or as working freely. And this is to grant that the will of God is the cause why everything merely possible in its own nature passes from everlasting into the condition of a thing future, if so be it were future at all. And indeed seeing no other cause can be pitched upon, this free will of God must be acknowledged to be the cause of it. And consequently the reason why everything becomes future is because God has determined it shall come to pass, but with this difference: all good things God hath determined shall come to pass by his election, all evil things God has determined shall come to pass by his permission. And the Scripture naturally affords plentiful testimony to confirm this, without forcing it to interpretations congruous hereunto, upon presumptuous grounds that these arguments proceed from understandings ‘purged from prejudice and false principles.’

5. My 5^th argument is this. If sin because of Reprobation, that is, of the decree of damnation, then either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God; not by necessity of nature as all that hitherto I have known confess. But I say neither can it be by the free constitution of God; for Mark what a notorious absurdity follows hence, and that unavoidably, namely, that God did ordain, that upon foresight of sin he would ordain them to damnation. Mark it well, “God did ordain that he would ordain, or God did decree that he would decree.” In which words God’s eternal decrees made the object of God’s decree. Whereas it is well known that the objects of God’s decrees are merely things temporal and cannot be things eternal. We truly say God did decree to create the world, to preserve the world, to redeem us, call us, justify us, sanctify and save us. But it cannot be truly said that God did decree to decree, or ordain to ordain. For to decree is the act of God’s will, and therefore it cannot be the object of the act of God’s will. Yet these arguments I am not so enamored with, as to force the interpretations of Scripture to such a sense as is suitable hereunto, presuming the purity of my understanding as ‘purged from prejudice and false principles.’ I would willingly content myself with observation of the apostle’s discourse in arguing to this effect, “Before the children were born or had done good or evil, it was said, ‘the elder shall serve the younger.’” Therefore the purpose of God concerning Reprobation stands not of works. And like as hence it is inferred that therefore election stands not of good works; so therehence may I infer, that therefore Reprobation stands not of evil works.

6. If sin foreseen be the cause meritorious of Reprobation, then faith and repentance and good works are the disposing causes unto election. For therefore evil works foreseen are made the meritorious cause of reprobation because evil works existence or the meritorious cause of damnation. If this be true, then also because faith and repentance and good works are the disposing causes unto salvation, than by the same force of reason faith repentance and good works foreseen must be the disposing cause unto election. But faith, repentance, and good works foreseen are not the disposing causes unto election as I prove thus:

1. If they were then the purpose of God according to election should be of faith, repentance and good works, which is expressly denied by the apostle is touching the last part; and may as evidently be proved to be denied by him in effect of the other parts also, by the same force of argumentation which he uses: as for example, from this antecedent of the apostle’s, “Before the children were born or had done good or evil,” it no more evidently follows that therefore the purpose of God according to election is not of works, then it follows that the same purpose of God according to election is not of faith, nor of repentance. For before they were born they were no more capable of faith, or of repentance than of any other good works. And undoubtedly faith and repentance are as good works as any other.

2. If God doth absolutely work faith in some and not in others according to the mere pleasure of his will, then it cannot be said that faith foreseen is the cause of any man’s election. For in this case faith is rather the means of salvation, than salvation a means of faith. Consequently, the intention of salvation rather precedes the intention of faith than the intention of faith can be said to precede the intention of salvation. And to this the Scripture accords, Acts 13:48, “As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life,” making ordination to everlasting life the cause why men believed. Answerable hereunto is Acts 2:47, “God added daily to the church such as should be saved;” and that of Paul to Titus, “according to the faith of God’s elect.” So that according to Paul’s phrase fides est electorum, but according to the Arminian’s doctrine the inverse hereof is a more proper and natural predication, as to say electio est fidelium.