The Atonement: Christ as the Second Adam

Christ acting as the second Adam, or according to a covenant with the Father, in the whole of His atoning work.

This idea must be carried with us, whether we consider the fundamental presuppositions of the atonement, as stated in some of the first sections, or discuss the special reference and extent of the atonement, as exhibited in section xli. (p. 312). The doctrine of the atonement cannot be understood without the idea of a conjunction between Christ and His people, whether or not it is called a covenant (pactum salutis), and whether or not we use the terms of the federal theology. The whole scheme of thought relating to the covenant occupied at one time an important. place in the Reformed Church, and in some portions of the Lutheran Church, though it never became general in the latter.

Of various elements which may be said to have concurred, if not to originate, at least to turn attention to this scheme of thought, the two following may be particularly named: the cavils of Socinus, and the subsequent rise of the Arminian controversy. As to the first of these concurring forces, I may mention that one of the objections against the satisfaction on which Socinus laid stress, was, that there ought to be at least some conjunction between the guilty and him that is punished; and he would not admit that there was any such conjunction or bond between Christ and us. This drove the defenders of the truth to assert the affirmative, and to define it. They main tained that Christ was united to us, not only as a partaker of our humanity by becoming one of us, our brother and friend, but also as He entered into a still closer conjunction as the Bridegroom, Head, Shepherd, Lord, King, and Surety of His people. Grotius, in his treatise, De Satisfactione, chap, iv., is particularly emphatic in asserting this close conjunction, on which the possibility of an atonement depends. Thus, in op position to Socinus, Grotius says, "It might be said here that man is not without relation to man, that there is a natural kindred and consanguinity between men, and between our flesh assumed by Christ. But another much greater conjunction between Christ and us was decreed by God, for He was ap pointed by God to be the Head of the body of which we are members. And here it must be observed, that Socinus erroneously confined to the flesh alone that conjunction which is sufficient for laying punishment upon one for another's sins, since here the mystical conjunction has no less power. This appears principally in the example of a king and a people. We cited above the history of the Israelites punished for the sin of David." A little afterwards, Grotius adds that this con junction lays the foundation for vicarious punishment: "There fore the sacred writings do not at all favour Socinus, declaring, as they do, that God did the very thing which he undeservedly accuses of injustice; but neither has he any greater defence from right reason, which it is wonderful that he so often boasts of, but nowhere shows. But that all this error may be re moved, it must be observed that it is essential to punishment that it be inflicted for sin, but that it is not likewise essential to it that it be inflicted on him who sinned; and that is manifest from the similitude of reward, favour, and revenge, — for reward is often wont to be conferred upon the children or relations of a well-deserving person, and favour on the kinsman of him who conferred the benefit, and revenge upon the friends of him that offended. Neither do they, on that account, cease to be what they are — reward, favour, and revenge. Add to this, that if it were against the nature of punishment, then this very thing would not be called unjust, but impossible. But God forbids a son to be punished by men for the father's fault; but impossible things are not forbidden. Moreover, injustice does not properly happen to a relation (such as punishment is), but to the action itself, such as the matter of punishment is. And here the true distinction must be inquired into, why it is not equally free to all to punish one for another's sin, and to bestow a favour or reward for another's merit or benefit; for an act which contains in it a reward or favour is a benevolent act, which, in its own nature, is permitted to all; but an act which has in it punishment, is a hurtful act, which is neither allowed to all, nor against all. Wherefore, that a punishment may be just, it is requisite that the penal act itself should be in the power of the punisher, which happens in a threefold way: either by the antecedent right of the punisher himself, or by the legitimate and valid consent of him about whose punishment the question is; or by the crime of the same person. When the act has become lawful by these modes, nothing prevents its being appointed for the punishment of another's sin, provided there be some conjunction between him that sinned and the party to be punished. And this conjunction is either natural, as between a father and a son; or mystical, as between king and people; or voluntary, as between the guilty person and the surety. Socinus appeals to the judgment of all nations; but as to God, the philosophers doubted not that the sins of parents were punished by Him in the children." I shall not quote further from this memorable chapter of Grotius, in which he overwhelms his opponent by the testimony of all classical antiquity. I have adduced this discussion, only to show how men came during the course of it to adopt and maintain a certain necessary conjunction between the Redeemer and the redeemed, which involved something more than a mere community of the same nature, and, in a word, the elements of a covenant.

But another cause concurred with the former. When the Arminian debates arose, and the five points were debated, many were led, during the course of this discussion, more and more to the conclusion that there was a given party in whose behalf all the provisions of redemption were contrived and carried into effect. Thus, Amesius, Coronis, p. 112, expresses himself: "Addam etiam insuper, si nullo modo versabatur ecclesia in mente divina, quum unctus et sanctificatus fuit Christus ad officium suum, turn caput constitutus fuit sine corpore, ac rex sine subditis ullis in praesentia notis, vel omniscio ipsi Deo: quod quam indignum sit thesauris illis divinae sapientiae qui in hoc mysterio absconditi fuerunt, non opus est ut ego dicam. Hoc unum perpendat cordatus Lector satisfactionem illam Christi pro nobis nocentibus susceptam valere non potuisse, nisi aliqua antecedente inter nos et Christum, conjunctione; tali scilicet qua designatus est a Deo ut caput esset corporis, cujus nos sumus membra; ut Vir cl. Hugo Grotius, relictis remonstrantibus, quos alibi defendit ingenue concedit. — Defensionis fidei Catholicae, pagina 66."

Hence the doctrine of the covenant was the concentrated essence of Calvinism, and appeared especially in a formed and jointed system, after the Synod of Dort. Cloppenburg maintained it just after that Synod. Thus these two elements above named led many of the greatest divines of the Reformed Church to bring out, and" to lay stress upon, a pactum salutis, or foedus, as necessary to a full understanding of the atonement. This doctrine has fallen out of the prominence it at one time occupied in theology. But whatever view may be held as to that scheme of thought, there is no room for two opinions as to the scriptural character of the doctrine, that there must be a certain conjunction between Christ and the redeemed.

It is due to the federal theology to state, that it was only meant to ground and to establish the undoubtedly scriptural doctrine of the two Adams (Rom. v. 12-20; 1 Cor. xv. 47). These are by no means to be regarded as two different lines of thought, or as two mutually exclusive modes of representing truth. They proceed on the same principle, and they come to precisely the same result, — the one from the view-point of humanity, the other from the counsels of the Trinity. No one can doubt, who examines the federal theology, that the design of those who brought that scheme of thought into general reception in the Reformed Church for two centuries, was principally to ground, and to put on a sure basis, the idea of the two Adams; that is, to show that there were, in reality, only two men in history, and only two great facts on which the fortunes of the race hinged. The leading federalists were Cloppenburg, Dick son the Scottish divine (who developed it so early as 1625 — see Life of Robert Blair, in the Wodrow publications — several years before the work of Cocceius, De Foedere, appeared in 1648), Cocceius, Burmann, Witsius, Strong, Owen, etc. etc. It became a magnificent scheme of theological thought in the hands of these men, and of others who took it up with ardour. That foreign thoughts afterwards came to be introduced into it, and that it became complicated by many additional elements, brought in to give it completeness, but which only lent it an air of human ingenuity and artificial construction, cannot be denied. But as to the point already referred to, there is no doubt that they intended to establish, by this mode of representation, that Christ and His people were to be regarded as one person in the eye of law; and that, properly speaking, there were only two heads of families, and only two great facts in history — the fall and the atonement.

Against this whole scheme of thought, a reaction set in a century ago. Nor can this be wondered at, when we remember that it was overdone at that time, and that a reaction was only the effort of the human mind to regain its equilibrium — as is always the case when anything is carried too far. It was over done, and now it is neglected.

But it is by no means to be repudiated, or put among the mere antiquities of Christian effort. This, or something like it, whether we adopt the federal nomenclature or not, must occur to every one who will follow out the revealed thoughts uttered by Christ Himself to their legitimate consequences. The only objection of any plausibility is, that the notion of a covenant presupposes a twofold will in God. To meet this objection, springing from an exclusive regard to the unity of the Godhead, it may be remarked, that the supposition of a council or covenant, having man's redemption for its object, has no more difficulty than the doctrine of a Trinity. Each person wills, knows, loves, and exercises acts to one another and to us; and as they are personally distinct in the numerical- unity of the divine essence, so, according to the order of subsistence, they each will, though not apart and isolated. Accordingly, Dr. Owen remarks against Biddle, in his Vindiciae: "Because of the distinct acting of the will of the Father, and of the will of the Son, with regard to each other, it is more than a decree, and hath the proper nature of a covenant or compact."

Whatever view may be taken, however, of that scheme of thought, the one important matter on which no doubt can be entertained by any scriptural divine, is, that as Adam was a public person, the representative of all his family, according to the constitution given to the human race, as contradistinguished from that of other orders of being, so Christ, the Restorer, stands in the same position to His family or seed. The world could be redeemed on no other principle than that on which it was at first constituted. Augustin's formula, ilk unus homo nos omnes fuimus, as applied to the first man, is perhaps the very best that has ever been given; and the same formula may be applied with equal warrant to the second man, the Lord from heaven. As applied to the atonement, this principle of a covenant, or of a conjunction between Christ and His seed, is simple and easily apprehended. The conditions being fulfilled by the second man, His people enter into the reward.

Thus Christ was commissioned to do a work for a people who were to reap the reward. The Father laid on Him the conditions given to Adam, with the additional one derived from guilt, and claimed satisfaction from the Son undertaking to act for a seed given to Him. Man could be redeemed only on the principle or constitution on which God placed him at first, and not on one altogether different; and the one aim of the federal theology was meant to base and to ground this biblical truth.

George Smeaton, The Doctrine of the Atonement as Taught by Christ Himself, Appendix on Sec. X.

He Was Numbered With The Transgressors

I may here notice another saying of Christ...containing ... a deep significance, which can only be apprehended when we read it in connection with Christ's suretyship or representative character. He said, before leaving the upper room, where He celebrated the last supper: 'This that is written of Me must yet be accomplished in Me, And He was numbered among transgressors' (Luke xxil 37). Now, are we to regard this remark of Christ, which embodies a quotation from Isaiah's prophecy, as containing nothing more than a description of the opinion entertained by men respecting Him? Does it mean that He was treated as if He had been a transgressor, or in a way which might have led a hasty observer or an undiscerning spectator to conclude that He was, or might be, a transgressor? No; by no means. Our Lord plainly takes the words in all their fulness of significance. He uses them not as denoting a mere as if, but as descriptive of the real sentence due to transgressors, and of the doom or punishment consequent on that righteous sentence carried out against transgressors. That is the meaning of the words; and the rationale is supplied by the fact, that the expression occurs in a chapter which, beyond doubt, predicts the vicarious sufferings of Christ, and repeats again and again the great thought, 'that He bore the sins of many' (Isa. liii.). No candid interpreter, interpreting simply by language, can have any other impression than this, that the righteous servant there named delivers many by a vicarious atonement. And Jesus, by quoting this statement as awaiting its accomplishment in Himself, manifestly applies that whole chapter of Isaiah to His own sufferings and death. We can interpret our Lord's words only in the sense that He was to be judicially numbered among transgressors, that is, numbered agreeably to the execution of a judicial sentence with transgressors. When Mark applies the same quotation to the position assigned to Christ between the two thieves at His crucifixion (Mark xv. 28), he brings out its meaning in all its compass of allusion. But He by no means excludes the preparatory stages of its accomplishment, or that which preceded the fact adduced as its fulfilment. The words, 'He was numbered with transgressors,' were accomplished not only when He shared a common lot with the malefactors, but also in all that preceded the erection of the three crosses on Golgotha, and, in fact, from the moment of His delivery into the hands of men. It was thus a judicial numbering of Christ with transgressors.

(1) The ARREST of Christ in the garden as if He were a criminal was the first step to the accomplishment of the prediction ('He was numbered among the transgressors'). He was there treated as a seditious man and as a malefactor in the room of us sinners, who had forfeited our freedom. We are evil-doers in so far as our relation to the city of God is concerned, that is, men who had renounced their dependence and allegiance, and who acted in all things as disobedient subjects. That arrest by the hand of justice was a real transaction at the hand of God, — was, in fact, the arrest of the guilty criminal in the person of the representative. And if the veil had been drawn aside, it would have been seen that all this was in the room of the sinner who should have been so apprehended. This is a real, not a symbolical transaction. And if the representative is seized, they whom He represented must go free. There is such a meaning in our Lord's words: 'Let these go free' (John xviii. 8). Our Lord deeply felt, indeed, the rude arrest in His tender human feelings when He said: 'Are ye come out as against a thief, with swords and with staves to take Me?' (Mark xiv. 48.) But He well knew, that though personally sinless, He was there in the room of sinners, and that the officers, acting as the ministers of God, seized Him as the sinner should have been seized. But, at the same time, to show how little human power could have prevailed against Him, unless He had given His consent, it was deemed fitting to let out some display or outbeaming of His majesty; and the utterance of the simple words, 'I am He,' prostrated the officers and band to the ground (John xviii. 6). Though innocent of the charge of sedition and blasphemy on which He was ostensibly arrested, His people were not; and hence He must needs be seized and bound in His capacity as the sinner's representative. When we see the Son of God bound in chains, what does the transaction exhibit but the captivity consequent upon our sin, which He had made His own, or the chain binding the sinner to the judgment of the great day? His arrest is His people's liberty; His bonds are their release.

(2) Not to mention all the intermediate points in the successive steps of Christ's sufferings, we shall notice, next in order, His TRIAL AND SENTENCE BEFORE THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURT, on the charge of blasphemy. In this whole transaction, when sentence of death was pronounced by the high priest, we have but the visible part of the great assize. He must, as the substitute of sinners, be found innocent, and yet made guilty, — be proved personally spotless, and yet be treated by the sentence given as one who was to be regarded as officially worthy of condemnation. And this anomalous trial brings together at all points these two things. The sentence by which He was condemned only indicated or announced the sentence passed by God upon the sin-bearer. The accusation on which He was tried in the Sanhedrim, AS brought against us, is not false. Moses accuses us, that the revelation given in the name of God has been disregarded and despised, and that the divine perfections have only been blasphemed by us. The accusation is so true and so undeniable, that there is no need of witnesses. The representative of sinners in His official capacity is silent, and puts in no plea in arrest of judgment. But His personal innocence must be apparent. And it was only His own true declaration of what He was as a divine person which brought down on Him, in lack of other evidence, the sentence that He was worthy of death. He thus appears personally innocent, but representatively guilty; and unless we carry with us these two ideas as the key to the whole trial, the narrative will be inexplicable, and the fact in the moral government of God an impenetrable mystery. That earthly court, dealing with the charge of blasphemy, or dishonour to the name and works and word of God, sentenced the sinner's surety, and pronounced upon our sin, much in the same way as the shadow on the sun-dial registers the movements taking place in another sphere. He was personally innocent; but as He stood there for us, He was truly chargeable with all the accusation which was then adduced. His silence at that tribunal opens our mouth to cry, 'Abba, Father.'

(3) The MOCKERY, the shame, and the indignity to which He was subjected, constituted the next part of His vicarious suffering. They were undeserved by that meek and patient sufferer, but well merited by us, in whose name He appeared, and whose person He bore. The wicked 'shall rise to shame and everlasting contempt' (Dan. xii. 2). And from that merited scorn due to sinners from all holy beings the sinless substitute was not exempt. He hid not His face from shame and from spitting.

(4) Omitting the desertion of His disciples and the denial of Peter, we advance to the next public act in connection with Christ's sufferings, — the trial and condemnation at the bar OF THE ROMAN GOVERNOR, ON A CHARGE OF REBELLION OR SEDITION. This is very much of the same kind with the trial before the high priest upon a charge of blasphemy, and is to be considered in a similar light. The course of our Lord's sufferings may with advantage be traced, as we have already done, on the sinner's history, and read off from it. The surety encountered, at each successive step, what should have taken place in the history of man's relation to God. For the very same relations, and not merely analogous ones, were occupied by the surety when He was tried and sentenced and condemned. It is note worthy that at Pilate's bar Jesus was silent (Matt. xxvii. 14). The explanation is to be found in the fact, that though personally sinless, He really, and not nominally, occupied the sinner's place. Hence the silence. He puts in no plea in arrest of judgment or in self- vindication. He was there not in His personal capacity, but in His official capacity, as the representative of sinners and the voluntary sin-bearer. He has nothing to adduce in extenuation or in exculpation, since every mouth must be stopped, and the whole world become guilty before God. He accepts the charge of guilt; and as the doom is the sinner's, not His, He submits to it as merited. When Pilate wished to deliver Him, if Jesus would only be aiding in His own defence, the Lord continued silent before His accusers, amid all the accusations adduced against Him. He was then making a real appearance at the bar of God, of which that earthly court of justice was but the foreground. He was personally innocent, and officially guilty. Hence His silence.

We must notice this anomalous trial specially in connection with the fact that He was sentenced as guilty while pronounced innocent. The examination of the judge was meant to serve the important purpose of manifesting the innocence of Jesus. And the startling fact, that a judge pronounces Him innocent, but condemns Him as guilty, must be historically brought about in the adorable providence of God, in order to exhibit the personal and the official in the Lord Jesus; or, in other words, to discover the sinless one and the sin-bearer. No man could more emphatically testify to Christ's innocence than Pilate. He had examined the accusations; he had heard all that the witnesses could adduce against Him, and was perfectly informed of everything in the case; and five times he declared that he found no fault in Him. This was done, too, in public, before His accusers, and in the presence of the vast multitude. And, not content with that public announcement, he, when he yielded at last to the clamour for the crucifixion, confirmed his judicial testimony to His innocence by the significant symbolical action of washing his hands, and declaring that he was innocent of the blood of that just man. It was fitting that all this should be done by a judge, and from the judicial bench, that Christ's innocence might be made apparent; and next, that the inference might be drawn that the doom of the guilty was transferred to Him as standing in a vicarious position. Thus He was personally innocent, though He was by no means to be accounted so in that official and vicarious capacity, in which alone He stood at Pilate's bar. There is no way of elucidating that anomalous trial, which went through the due forms of law, unless we hold that He was truly innocent, but officially guilty.

(5) The last step of Christ's sufferings, the crucifixion, immediately followed the sentence of Pilate. The intermediate details, such as the mockery, scorn, and indignity inflicted on Him in many forms, we shall omit; though these, too, were vicarious, as appears from the words, 'by His stripes we are healed.' We shall omit, too, the Lord's words to the daughters of Jerusalem when they wept for Him tears of sympathy, as He toiled along the public way under the burden of the cross, — tears which, He shows them, were out of place as shed for Him. We shall limit ourselves to the crucifixion itself and to the closing acts of His life.

The crucifixion, a Roman mode of punishment, was not only peculiarly painful and ignominious in the sight of man, but was meant to indicate the amazing fact, that Christ, by being suspended on the tree, was made a curse. The words of Moses quoted by Paul are express to this effect (Gal. iii. 13). The Lord Jesus was thus, personally considered, the beloved Son and the sinless man, but, officially considered, the curse-bearer in the room of sinners. The Son of God, truly bearing sin with a view to condemn it in the flesh, was exhibited as made a curse by the very fact of enduring this punishment. We have thus to draw the same distinction, as we already mentioned, between Christ considered personally and Christ considered officially. If there ever was a spot where sin could be laid without entailing the inevitable doom of a righteous condemnation, it was here when it was borne on the sinless humanity of the incarnate Son; and we see that even there sin was condemned in the flesh and righteously visited. The surety was tried, sentenced, condemned, and made a curse for us, that we might not come into condemnation.

During those awful hours on the cross when made a curse for us, the Lord Jesus sustained that desertion, which was just the endurance of the death of the soul, when sin separates between God and the soul, and when God hides His face from us. To this it is not necessary to refer further, after what was said in the previous section. The actions of the Lord Jesus when He hung on the cross, were in the highest degree momentous and significant. These expiatory sufferings, 'an offering and sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour' (Eph. v. 2), were so efficacious, that they were made the ground of two signal displays of grace, even while He was on the cross. The one of these was the salvation of the dying malefactor, who was made an eminent trophy of His redemption work, and was enabled to recognise Him as a sufficient Saviour, even in that deep abasement and humiliation. The other was the prayer for forgiveness to His crucifiers, whether we regard the scope of the prayer as comprehending the individuals then before Him, or as extending to the preservation of the Jewish nation.

After these hours of inconceivable sorrow and desertion on the cross, under a darkness which just resembled the blackness awaiting the lost, the Lord felt that His work was accomplished; and He gave utterance to that saying which has brought light, rest, and liberty to so many minds: 'It is finished' (John xix. 30). He meant that the expiatory sufferings had reached their climax, and were sufficient, that the guilt of mankind was fully atoned for, and that there was nothing left undone. He felt that God and man were reunited and reconciled; and now He had but to resign His spirit into His Father's hands. As priest and victim, He had only now one act to perform, — to lay down His life by the priestly act of commending His spirit to God. Nature was not exhausted, nor did life ooze away; for He still had power over His own life, and no man took it from Him (John x. 18). After having done all and endured all, He deemed it fitting, without more delay, to resign His life or spirit into His Father's hand as an acceptable sacrifice. It was the High Priest offering up His soul to God that said, 'Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit.' And He uttered it with a loud voice, to show that strength still remained in Him, and that, by His own authority, He released the spirit from the lacerated and wounded body.

The curse was, 'Thou shalt die;' and now it was exhausted, and sin annihilated. Now heaven and earth were reunited; God and man were at one again.

George Smeaton, The Doctrine of the Atonement as Taught by Christ Himself

Witherspoon on Substitutionary Atonement

We come now to speak of the Covenant of Grace. This, taking it in a large sense, may be said to comprehend the whole plan of salvation through Jesus Christ. I am not to mention everything that belongs to this subject; but before entering directly into the constitution of the covenant of grace, it will be proper to speak a little of the doctrine of satisfaction for the guilt of a creature.

As to the first of these. Was satisfaction or some atonement necessary? would it have been inconsistent with divine justice to have pardoned sinners without it? might not the sovereignty and mercy of God have dispensed with the punishment of sin, both in the sinner and in the surety? The agitation of this question, and the zeal that is shewn by some upon it, I cannot help saying, seems to arise from an inward aversion to the truth itself of the satisfaction, and the consequences that follow from it. What does it signify, though anyone should admit that God by his sovereignty might have dispensed with demanding satisfaction, if notwithstanding it appears in fact that he has demanded and exacted it? “that without shedding of blood there is no remission,” and “that there is no other name,” &c. Whether it has been so ordained because to have done otherwise would have been inconsistent with the divine perfections, or because so it seemed good unto God, seems at least an unnecessary if not an indecent question. We have an infinite concern in what God has done, but none at all in what he might have done. On what is really difficult upon this subject, we may however make the few following remarks.

I. From its actually taking place as the will of God, we have good reason to say it was the wisest and best; the rather that we find many of the highest encomiums on the Divine perfections, as shewing in this great dispensation his power, wisdom, mercy and justice. His wisdom in a particular manner is often celebrated, Eph. 3. 10. Rom. 11. 33. At the same time it is proper to observe the harmony of the divine attributes, that the justice of God appears more awful in the sufferings of Christ than if the whole human race had been devoted to perdition; and his mercy more astonishing and more amiable in the gift of his Son, than it could have been in the total remission of all sin without any satisfaction, had it been possible.

There is a particular proof of the necessity of satisfaction that arises from the death of Christ, considered as intimately united with the Divine nature, which it has been already proved that he possessed. Can we suppose that such a measure would have been taken, if it had not been necessary? Can we suppose that the eternal Son of God would have humbled himself thus, and been exposed to such a degree of temptation, and such amazing sufferings, if it had not been necessary?

3. All the accounts given us in scripture of the nature of God, his perfections and government confirm this supposition. The infinite justice and holiness of his nature are often mentioned in scripture; that he hates sin, and cannot look upon it but with abhorrence, and particularly that he will by no means spare the guilty. It is sometimes objected here, that justice differs from other attributes; and that its claims may be remitted, being due only to the person offended. But this which applies in part to man, cannot at all be applied to God. I say it applies in part to man, because a matter of private right, independent of the public good, he may easily pass by. But it is not so with magistrates or public persons, nor even with private persons, when they take in the consideration of the whole. Besides, when we consider the controversy about the justice of God and what it implies, we shall see the greatest reason to suppose what is called his vindictive justice, viz. a disposition to punish sin, because it truly merits it, even independently of any consequence of the punishment, either for the reformation of the person, or as an example to others. The idea of justice and guilt carries this in it, and if it did not there would be an apparent iniquity in punishing any person for a purpose different from his own good.

II. The second question upon the satisfaction is, whether it was just and proper to admit the substitution of an innocent person in the room of the guilty. This is what the Socinians combat with all their might. They say it is contrary to justice to punish an innocent person; that God must always treat things as they really are, and therefore can never reckon it any proper atonement for sin to punish one that never committed any sin. Before I state the reasoning in support of this fundamental doctrine of the gospel, I will first briefly point out the qualifications necessary in such a substitution. (1) The security under taking must be willing; it would certainly be contrary to justice to lay a punishment upon an innocent person without his consent. (2) He must be free and independent having a right over his own life, so that he is not account able to any other for the disposal of it. (3) The person having the demand must be satisfied and contented with the substitution, instead of personal punishment. (4) That the surety be truly able to make satisfaction in full. (5) That it be in all respects as useful, and that the sufferer be not lost to the public. (6) Some add that he be related and of the same nature with the guilty. This is generally added from the constitution of Christ's person, and in that instance surely has a great degree of suitableness, but does not seem to me to be so necessary as the other particulars for establishing the general principle.

Now supposing all these circumstances, vicarious satisfaction for sin seems to me easily and perfectly justifiable. To make this appear, attend to the three following observations:

(1) There is nothing in it at all contrary to justice. If any innocent person were punished against his will, or laid under a necessity of suffering for the cause of another, it would evidently be repugnant to the idea of justice. But when it is done, as by the supposition, willingly and freely, injustice is wholly excluded. If we could indeed suppose ignorance and rashness in the undertaking, so that he consented to what he did not understand, there would be injustice, but this also is wholly excluded in the case before us.

(2) There is nothing in it contrary to utility, because it has precisely the same effect in demonstrating the evil of sin in the one case as in the other. In any human government it certainly serves as much to ratify the law, and in many cases the exacting the debt with rigor of a surety is a more awful sanction to the law, than even the satisfaction of the offending party. We have not in all history I think, an instance of this kind so striking as the lawgiver of the Lorrians who had made a law, that adultery should be punished with the loss of both the eyes. His own son was shortly after convicted of the crime; and to fulfill the law, he suffered one of his own eyes to be put out, and one of his son's. Everybody must perceive that such an example was a greater terror to others than if the law had been literally inflicted on the offender. After having mentioned these two particulars, I observe that the thing is in a most precise and exact manner laid down in scripture. It is impossible to invent expressions, that are either more strong or more definite than are there to be found. It is an observation of some of the Socinian writers that the word satisfaction is not to be found in scripture, and in this they often triumph: but nothing can be more ridiculous, for satisfaction is a modern term of art, and unknown in that sense to antiquity. But can there be anything more plain than that it is intended to express the very meaning so fully, and so variously expressed both in the scriptures and the heathen writers. The word in the Old Testament most frequently used is, atoning, making atonement for sin or for the soul. What could be more plain than not only the great day of atonement, but the daily sacrifice, in which certain men were appointed to represent the people of Israel and lay their hands on the head of the devoted beast; and confess the sins of the people, which had not any other intelligible meaning than the transferring the guilt from the sinner to the victim. The sprinkling the blood in the Old Testament upon the horns of the altar, whence by allusion the blood of Christ is called the blood of sprinkling, carries this truth in it, in the plainest manner — and the prophecies of Isaiah, chap. 53. 5. "he was" wounded for our transgression," &c. "When he shall give his soul an offering for sin." But were there the least obscurity in the type, the truth as stated in the New Testament, would put the matter out of all doubt. The expressions are so many that we cannot, and we need not enumerate them all — "redeemed — bought with a price — redeemed not with corruptible things, as silver or gold, but with the precious blood of Christ— This is my blood shed for many, for the remission of sins — he gave himself a ransom for all — unto him that loved us, and warned us from our sins in his own blood."

I would just add here, that as by the constitution of our nature, and our being made to descend in a certain succession by natural generation, there is a communication of guilt and impurity from Adam; so we have in human society, and indeed inseparable from it, the idea of communication by natural relation of honor and shame, happiness and misery, as well as the clearest notion of voluntary substitution. We see that the worth and eminent qualities of any person, give lustre and dignity to his posterity; and wickedness or baseness does just the contrary. We see that men may easily, and do necessarily, receive much pleasure from the happiness of their relations, and misery in sympathy with their suffering. And as to voluntary substitution, it is as familiar to us, as any transaction in social life. It is true there are not many instances of men's being bound in their life for one another; for which several good reasons may be assigned. There are not many men of such exalted generosity as to be willing to forfeit life for life; it is rarely that this would be a proper or adequate satisfaction to the law; and it would not be the interest of human society, commonly to receive it. Yet the thing is far from being inhuman or unpractised. There are some instances in ancient times, in which men have procured liberty for their friends, by being confined in their room. And both in ancient and modern times, hostages delivered by nations, or public societies, are obliged to abide the punishment due to their constituents.

(3) The third question on the subject of satisfaction is, Whether it was necessary that the redeemer or mediator should be a divine person? It may be asked, whether an angel of the highest order, who was perfectly innocent, might not have made satisfaction for the sins of men? Perhaps this is one of the many questions in theology, that are unnecessary or improper. It is sufficient to say that it appears either to have been necessary or best, that one truly divine should make satisfaction for sin, since it has been ordained of God, who does nothing unnecessary.

But besides this, it seems to be consonant to other parts of revealed religion, particularly the infinite evil of sin as committed against God, for which no finite being seems sufficient to atone. To which we may add, that all finite, dependent, created beings are under such obligations themselves, that it is not easy to see what they can do in obedience to the will of God, which can have any merit in it, or which they would not be obliged to do for the purpose of his glory at any time; neither does any created being seem so much his own master, as to enter into any such undertaking.

There is an objection made to this doctrine, sometimes to the following purpose. How could the second person of the ever blessed Trinity be said to make satisfaction? Was he not equally offended with the other? Could he make satisfaction to himself? But this objection is easily solved, for not to mention that we cannot transfer with safety everything human to God, the thing in question is by no means unknown in human affairs. Though for the payment of a debt on which the creditor insists, it would be ridiculous to say he might pay himself; yet in the character of a magistrate sitting to judge a criminal where he represents the public, it is no way unsuitable for him to put off the public person, and satisfy the demands of justice, and preserve the honor of the law.

Here I would conclude by just observing, that there is no necessity of a surety's doing just the same thing in kind that the guilty person was bound to do. The character and dignity of the surety may operate so far as to produce the legal effect, and make the satisfaction proper for giving its due honor to the law. Thus in the sufferings of Christ, the infinite value of the sufferer's person, makes the sufferings to be considered as a just equivalent to the eternal sufferings of a finite creature.

John Witherspoon, Lectures on Divinity, Lecture XVI, Works: Volume 4

Answering Objections to The Atonement 5

V.   Finally, it is objected that the atonement of Christ was unnecessary. It is supposed that God could have maintained His Honor equally in acquitting sinners with or without a satisfaction.

Of course, we have already addressed this ridiculous assumption in part when we refuted the 3^rd objection. But we will take it head on now as a separate issue.

The problems with this objection:

A. It is presumptuous. It is not for us, on the ground of mere abstract reasoning, to say what is necessary or not necessary for Almighty God. We step way beyond our limits when we venture to say what would or would not be honorable for God to do. It is setting up our weak, erring, finite understandings as judges over the infinite mind of Jehovah.

B. For the sake of argument, let us assume that the necessity of the atonement could not be shown, it would not follow, even then, that we are at liberty to pronounce it unnecessary. There may be reasons for it which we have never discovered, or which we are not qualified to comprehend. We are not justified in assuming we know as much as God about the situation.

C. This objection works on a horridly imperfect and restricted view of the nature of man's sin against God. Inadequate views of sin are at the bottom of almost all doctrinal and practical errors in the world. Men are ready to regard it as something altogether different from what it is regarded by God. It is our natural bent to downplay the sinfulness of sin.

D. Further, this objection proceeds on an imperfect view of human salvation. Even assuming for argument's sake that God might honorably forgive sin without a satisfaction, it should be remembered that remission of sins is not the whole of salvation. In other words, salvation entails more than mere pardon of sins. Supposing that God could forgive sins without a satisfaction, this leaves completely untouched all the other areas of salvation.

Answering Objections to The Atonement 4

IV. It is further objected that the innocent suffering for the guilty is inconsistent with reason and with the goodness and justice of God. How, so goes the objection, can it be imaginable that an innocent victim should suffer for the guilty?

Problems with this objection:

A. It must simply be admitted by all that, under the moral government of God, sometimes the innocent do suffer for the guilty.

B. This objection weighs against opponents of the doctrine of the atonement. They claim that Christ suffered for the benefit of mankind. They will admit that, at least as far as the alleged grounds of his sufferings, He was innocent. No objector has ever claimed that Christ was anything but perfectly upright and immaculately pure. Well, what is this but the innocent suffering for the guilty? We say He suffered in our stead; they say He suffered for our benefit. But at the end of the day, it is still the innocent suffering for the guilty.

C. The objectors overlook that, although Christ was personally innocent, He was viewed as legally guilty. In Himself, He could boldly defy His accusers: “Which one of you convinceth me of sin?” (John 8:46) But as the Surety and substitute of elect sinners, “the Lord laid on Him the iniquity of us all.” “He made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin.” “He bore the sins of the many.” (2 Corinthians 5:21; Isaiah 53:6, 12)

D. Christ's sufferings, being of a voluntary nature, deflate this objection. An innocent person being compelled to suffer for the guilty would be the height of injustice. But this is not the case with the atonement. The Father did not put a gun to Christ’s head and force Him, against His will to die for the elect sinners. Christ voluntarily gave up His life for the elect sinners. Regarding His life, He Himself said, “I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again” (John 10:18). Romans chapter 5 shoots this objection right between the eyes.

E. This objection appear even more futile when we note that in this arrangement (the innocent suffering for the guilty), the ends served by punishment are more fully attained by the innocent’s suffering than by the suffering of the guilty themselves. At the same time, no injury is done either to the Law or to the sufferer. The Law is neither harmed nor violated, and no ultimate harm comes to the Surety. The integrity of the Law is upheld and the retribution prescribed is meted out. The Surety fulfills the Law perfectly, pays the penalty for its violation, yet because He is God, He is able to bear the infinite wrath of God in the brief span of time He spent on earth. When He cried out, “It is finished;” it truly was finished. Christ no longer suffers for sin.

F. It ought also to be taken into consideration that, in respect of the substitutionary sufferings of the Son of God, the rewards of the Mediator for His suffering far outweigh the suffering itself. In other words, it is of such a compensative arrangement that it prevents all ultimate injury to the party concerned. (cf. Philippians 2:1-10). We rejoice in the cross of Christ as the source of our pardon. Our satisfaction is heightened by beholding it succeeded by the crown. He was for a only little while made lower than the angels for the suffering of death. But now He is crowned with glory and honor and now sits at the right hand of the Father while His enemies are made His footstool. His humiliation was followed by His exaltation.

G. Finally, it must be borne in mind that the substitution of Christ is a case which is absolutely peculiar. The substitutionary atonement of Christ is exactly of the nature required. It is an event that is unique, in the fullest sense of that word. We have no reason to imagine that anything like it ever existed before, or will ever exist again. It is a singular event in the divine administration. Christ has once suffered for sin. Christ was once offered to bear the sins of the many. Once in the end of the world did He appear to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself. (Isaiah 53:12; Hebrews 9:28)

Answering Objections to The Atonement 3

III.  It is further objected that the doctrine of the atonement is not compatible with the gracious nature of pardon.

Those who hold this objection assert that forgiveness of sins is always ascribed by the Scriptures to grace. It is an act of free favor, of sovereign goodness. But, they claim that it is no longer grace but an act of justice when it hinges on the supposition that Jesus made satisfaction for sin. Instead of it being merciful of God to pardon sin, it would be unjust of Him to withhold forgiveness. Simply put: grace and justice are so opposed to each other that if something is done in deference to justice, it cannot be of grace.

Problems with this objection:

A. This objection supposes justice and grace to be opposed to one another, not only in their nature but also in their exercise, so that both cannot have respect to the same object. We need only recall what we have already said about the perfect harmony of these perfections in the divine nature to dispel this objection. This is a nonsensical objection unless we are willing to argue that God suspends one of His attributes when He acts according to another. In short, this objection cannot be made unless you are willing to posit a God with multiple personalities.

B. This objection overlooks the origin of Christ's satisfaction. Man did not find a Surety for himself. If someone besides God had provided the ground on which pardon rests, there might be room to deny the graciousness of the act. But it is God who provides the Mediator and the work of the Surety. God manifests His grace in determining to pardon man and further demonstrates it by providing a legal ground on which pardon may proceed in a way that is completely consistent with justice.

C. This objection also overlooks an obvious fact: Although the satisfaction of Christ may be regarded as a legal purchase of forgiveness, the bestowing of forgiveness is completely act of grace as the recipient is concerned. It is free pardon to men. They have no claim to it. No satisfaction was made by them. They do nothing to procure forgiveness for themselves. If pardon is an act of justice at all, it is only so to Christ. To the sinner it is pure sovereign goodness.

D. It is also falsely assumed that God could have given a display of His grace by pardoning sin without satisfaction. In layman’s terms: If God wanted to, He could just forgive sins, because He’s a nice guy, and because that’s what nice guys do. There is actually no need to punish His Son so that He could forgive us. Couldn’t He just overlooked or sins and shown how loving He really is? This would be a display of His grace.

It seems to me that the opposite would be much truer. This would display no grace at all. Imagine for a minute that God had pardoned sin without an atonement, and pardoned not only some people, but all the family of man. What inference would intelligent and moral beings have been disposed to draw from this? That God is gracious, and that His grace is without limits? I think not. Wouldn't it be far more reasonable to infer that sin, the violation of His law, was no big deal, at least not as big a deal as had been imagined, considering it could be so easily passed over by a Being of such absolute moral perfection?

Answering Objections to The Atonement 2

II.   It has also been argued that the doctrine of the atonement is inconsistent with divine immutability. The atonement is supposed to effect a change in the mind of God: that He is reconciled, on account of the atonement, to those with whom He was formerly displeased, and compelled to love what He formerly hated.

The problems with this objection are:

A. Much of what we said above regarding the first objection could equally be applied to this one, because at heart it resolves into the same objection. But it should also be noted that whenever orthodox theologians have used language which seems to imply a change in God, this is nothing more than what is done by the inspired authors themselves. Scripture frequently uses that we call anthropopathism.

B. This may seem like we are shifting the difficulty from our shoulders to that of the authors of Scripture. But look at it this way: Are we to suppose, on the authority of Scripture, no less, that the atonement does effect a change on the immutable God? This would be blasphemy. What we affirm is that the texts of Scripture which do use anthropopathism only seem to imply a change in God. We do not say that they really imply such a thing.

Well, what then do they imply? To speak of a change in the nature, or attributes, or will of God is blasphemous and absurd. But it is neither blasphemous nor absurd to speak of a change in the mode of the divine administration. Anger, wrath and displeasure are not the same passions in God that they in man when we use those words. They are terms which denote the binding opposition of God’s rectitude to those who have violated the righteous law of the Lord who loves righteousness. They describe the relation into which iniquity brings transgressors to the Lawgiver and Judge of the universe. It is the language of government not the language of passion. Hence what the atonement effects is, not a change in God the Lawgiver, but a change in the administration of His government: a change in the relation that subsists between His creatures and Him. 

C. This objection is an explicit denial of the doctrine of Election. It works on the supposition that God’s love for His elect is no different than for the non-elect, or that God has the same love for those He has reprobated as He has for the elect. God has set His chesed love upon the elect from before the foundations of the world, and therefore He was not compelled by the atonement to love elect sinners for whom He had previously had no chesed.

Answering Objections to The Atonement 1

The term atonement is thrown around in Christian circles from time to time. We often hear about various theories and objections. In this series, we will define Atonement in the biblical sense and then handle the five most common objections to the doctrine.

I have had great difficulty in assigning a name to this definition because, although it is certainly fits the bill of Reformed, calling it “Reformed” would be selling it short because it is a definition that is represented in the writings of the Church Fathers and the best of the Church’s theologians prior to the Reformation. It might be best to call it a catholic definition of the Atonement, to signify its veracity universally and historically.

The Atonement means: That perfect satisfaction given to the Law and justice of God, by the sufferings and death of Jesus Christ, on behalf of elect sinners of mankind, on account of which they are delivered from condemnation.

I.     Objection is made to the doctrine of the atonement that it represents God in a less than favorable light. Emphasizing as it does, the fact that God demands satisfaction for sin, as a just Judge, is said to destroy the attribute of mercy and resolve God’s whole character into strict, inexorable justice.

The Atonement is presented as if the death of Christ procures the mercy or love of God for sinners; as if Christ’s death is that which makes God willing to forgive the sins of his creatures – as if without it, He would not be willing. The atonement is thus portrayed as a motivator, or some kind of inducement which effects a change in God’s mind from wrath to compassion.

Problems with this objection:

A. The objection has a mistaken view of what the atonement is understood to produce. Let’s clear the decks: No one who understands this subject ever imagines that the work of Christ is, in any sense the cause of God’s love, mercy or grace; but the medium through which these perfections of God find expression to guilty creatures. The atonement is never regarded as necessary to produce love in God toward men, rather as necessary for His love to be manifested. Christ’s satisfaction for sin does not make God love the elect; it demonstrates the love He bore toward them in His heart from eternity past.

B. The objection proceeds on the mistaken assumption that God is ready to pardon sin without satisfaction, and, that retributive justice is not part of God's character. Our objectors therefore, falsely view forgiveness as the result of a purely arbitrary resolve of God’s will, which has nothing to do with law and government.

We must remind our objector that God is just as well as merciful. Rectitude is as essential a feature of the divine Being as is love. If the Scriptures represent God as a loving Father 'in whom compassions flow,' (Psalm 86:13) they no less conspicuously reveal Him as a Lawgiver 'who will by no means clear the guilty' (Exodus 34:7). These two things must never be set in opposition to each other. Rather they must be considered as equally essential, coexistent, cooperative, and congruent. It is a huge mistake to think of God as acting sometimes from the one attribute and at other times acting from the other. In other words, we must not imagine God at one time acting according to mercy, and at another according to justice. He acts in harmony with both at all times. Exercising the one never entails suspending the other. When God punishes the guilty, it is not at the expense of mercy. When God forgives the sinner, it is not at the expense of justice. Mercy operates on a principle that agrees with justice. So while mercy inclines God to forgive, justice must receive satisfaction in order for forgiveness to be given. Deny this, and you place in clashing opposition two essential attributes of God’s nature. But admit this, and the objection we are considering falls dead to the ground. The satisfaction which the doctrine of atonement supposes to be made by Christ is necessary, not to awaken the feeling of mercy in God’s heart, but to reconcile the merciful forgiveness of sin with the impartial demands of justice.